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SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS AND
THE CASE FOR AN FGD (FAIRER GOVERNMENT
DISCLOSURE) REGIME
DONNA M. NAGY*
RICHARD W. PAINTER**
This Article addresses a problem at the intersection of securities
regulation and government ethics: the selective disclosure of market-moving
information, by federal officials in the executive and legislative branches, to
securities investors outside the government who use that information for trading.
These privileged investors, often aided by political intelligence consultants, can
profit substantially from their access to knowledgeable sources inside the
government. In most instances, however, neither the disclosure nor the trading
violates the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (under which the
insider trading prohibitions arise). This legally protected favoritism undermines
investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of securities markets—and in
government itself. Congress considered these harms in the debates leading up to
the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012. But it
wisely opted to study the role of political intelligence in financial markets before
legislating further.
To address securities trading on the basis of selectively disclosed
government information, this Article examines an analogous situation in the
private sector that plagued individual investors until relatively recently. Selective
disclosure of issuer information by corporate executives to securities analysts
and professional investors had been regarded as blatantly unfair yet, in most
instances, not illegal. Regulation FD, which the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) adopted in 2000, addressed this unfairness by looking
beyond the construct of fraudulent tipping and trading under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The solution involved
regulating the timing and manner of disclosures by corporate insiders, rather
than the conduct of outsiders who gather and trade on the basis of those
disclosures. Regulation FD embraced this approach for publicly traded
companies and corporate executives have been adhering to it for more than a
decade.
This Article proposes an analogous FGD regime—standing for Fairer
Government Disclosure—that would prompt federal agencies, as well as
members of Congress and their staffs, to deploy a variety of strategies that could
substantially reduce the amount of selective disclosure of nonpublic government
information to persons who are likely to use it in securities trading. The Article
first gathers together press reports, agency and congressional correspondence,
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and other materials that demonstrate the ubiquity of selective disclosure in the
federal government. It then analyzes insider trading law to show that most of
these instances of selective disclosure are not illegal. The Article concludes that
the problem can be solved—or at least curtailed—with more effective internal
controls on the federal officials who selectively disclose government
information. It thus begins a discussion as to how such controls could be
developed without compromising the quality and timeliness of disclosures to
persons, including voters, who must have information in order to make
informed decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Information is said to be “the lifeblood of our securities markets”1
and “the currency of democracy.”2 But when government officials
selectively disclose market-moving information to certain privileged
investors, leaks of this sort benefit neither markets nor democracy.
Instead, ordinary investors and citizens lacking preferential access to
the inside of government suffer a double blow: they lose out in the
markets to securities traders with “unerodable informational
advantages”3 and their playing field is skewed by government officials
who should be serving the public at large rather than catering to the
interests of a favored few.4 To be sure, government officials who use
their positions to enhance the profit in their own investment portfolios
undermine market confidence and the democratic process as well.5 But
a government official’s own securities trading on the basis of material
nonpublic government information falls squarely within the insider
trading prohibitions arising under the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws, namely, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
1.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228 (Dec. 20,
1999).
2.
The quote is often attributed to President Thomas Jefferson. E.g.,
National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,030
(Sept. 21, 1993).
3.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1997) (quoting Victor
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 356 (1979)).
4.
See generally RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA
DESERVES: HOW ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE (2009).
5.
A recent series of investigative reports in the Washington Post has placed
congressional officials and their investment practices into the public spotlight. See,
e.g., David S. Fallis et al., Congressional Earmarks Sometimes Used to Find Projects
near Lawmakers’ Properties, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2012, at A1; Dan Keating et al.,

Members of Congress Trade in Companies while Making Laws that Affect Those Same
Firms, WASH. POST, June 24, 2012, at A1; Kimberly Kindy et al., Lawmakers
Reworked Financial Portfolios after Talks with Fed, Treasury Officials, WASH. POST,
June 25, 2012, at A7. These investment practices have also been scrutinized in a
controversial book. PETER SCHWEIZER, THROW THEM ALL OUT: HOW POLITICIANS AND
THEIR FRIENDS GET RICH OFF INSIDER STOCK TIPS, LAND DEALS, AND CRONYISM THAT
WOULD SEND THE REST OF US TO PRISON (2011).
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of 1934 (Exchange Act)6 and Rule 10b-5.7 In contrast, for reasons we
shall explain, the selective disclosure of material nonpublic government
information, or securities trading on the basis of that information,
seldom constitutes fraud under these provisions.8 As the Supreme Court
recognized more than thirty years ago, “not every instance of financial
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under Section 10(b).”9
Unfortunately,
the
selective
disclosure
of
nonpublic
market-moving information is a longstanding tradition in the federal
government. In 1789, political allies and friends of the governing
Federalists bought up federal and state Revolutionary War bonds that
were trading at thirty-to-forty percent of face value.10 These extremely
fortunate investors based their purchases on advance knowledge of
then-United States Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s plan to
pay the bonds at face value as a means of bolstering the United States’
credit rating.11 Ironically, in the first few days of August 2011, history
may have repeated when officials—perhaps at Standard and Poors
(S&P), but conceivably at the United States Treasury Department—
appeared to have selectively disclosed to some bond sellers the advance
information that S&P would downgrade the credit rating of the federal

6.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules
prohibiting “manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s]” in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security).
7.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”). Because Congress has not enacted a federal securities statute that explicitly
prohibits securities trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, insider
trading is generally illegal only insofar as it is fraudulent. For past Rule 10b-5
prosecutions against federal officials for their own securities trading, see, for example,
Cheng Yi Liang et al., Litigation Release No. 22,171 (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22171.htm (announcing guilty plea and
settlement of civil charges against former chemist with the United States Food and
Drug Administration who garnered profits totaling more than $3.7 million from trading
in pharmaceutical stocks based on confidential drug approval information); Acree,
Litigation Release No. 14,231, 57 SEC Docket 1579 (Sept. 13, 1994) (discussing a
former employee of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency who settled civil
charges that he traded in securities of several bank holding companies while in
possession of material nonpublic information); Saunders, Litigation Release No. 9744,
26 SEC Docket 75 (Sept. 2, 1992) (announcing guilty plea and the settlement of civil
charges against civilian employed by Navy who had purchased shares in a company that
was about to be awarded a government contract).
8.
See infra Part I.B.3.
9.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (citing Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–77 (1977)).
10.
See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
11.
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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government from AAA to AA+.12 Three years earlier, federal officials
knew more than markets did about what the Treasury would do—or not
do—in response to the financial crisis of 2008 and they met frequently
with Wall Street executives in their attempts to resolve the crisis.13 It is
unclear how much nonpublic government information was disclosed,
when, and to whom. But, to take just one instance, then-Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson is said to have privately briefed a dozen or so
hedge fund managers and investment bankers on July 21, 2008,
apparently revealing advance plans for a partial government takeover of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.14
Over the past several years, financial journalists have catalogued a
litany of other private briefings conducted by federal officials which
very likely generated millions of dollars in trading profits for the
privileged attendees or their clients.15 Notable briefings include those
by executive branch officials at the Federal Reserve,16 the Pentagon,17
the Department of Education (DOE),18 and the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS).19 A Wall Street Journal front page
article in December 2011 then focused the public eye on Congress,
revealing “a growing, lucrative—and legal—practice” that employs a
network of persons who work with hedge funds and other professional
investors to arrange private meetings with members and legislative
staffers from both political parties, with the meetings often convened in
the Capitol Building itself.20
There is little doubt that Congress regards securities trading on the
basis of selectively disclosed government information as a national
problem that undermines investor confidence in the fairness and
integrity of our securities markets—and in government itself. But for
much of 2012, concerns about selective disclosure to privileged
investors were relegated to the sidelines while Congress sought to
See infra notes 110–113 and accompanying text.
See Kindy et al., supra note 5.
See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
See Eamon Javers, Washington Whispers to Wall Street: Low-Profile
Firms Enjoy a Lucrative Business Selling ‘Political Intelligence,’ BUS. WK., Dec. 26,
2005/Jan. 2, 2006, at 42; Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Hedge Funds Pay Top
Dollar for Washington Intelligence, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2011, at A1; Brody Mullins
& Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in Washington, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at A1; Jim Snyder, K Street Phones Wall Street: Political Inside
Info for Hedge Funds Moves Stock Prices, HILL, Feb. 15, 2005, at 1.
16.
See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
17.
See infra notes 95–100 and accompanying text.
18.
See infra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
19.
See infra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
20.
Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Inside Capitol, Investor Access Yields
Rich Tips, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2011, at A1.
12.
13.
14.
15.

1290

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

clarify the law as it pertained to securities trading by its own members
and their staffs. Fueled in large part by a claim in a 60 Minutes
broadcast that congressional insider trading was “perfectly legal,”21
momentum grew swiftly for congressional hearings22 and bipartisan
legislation, which ultimately passed with landslide votes of 96-3 in the
Senate and 417-2 in the House.23 On April 4, 2012, President Barack
Obama signed into law the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge
Act (the STOCK Act).24 The Act states explicitly that members of
Congress and congressional employees, as well as all officers and
employees in the executive and judicial branches of the federal
government, “are not exempt from the insider trading prohibitions
arising under the securities laws, including Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5 thereunder.”25 It
furthers specifies that for purposes of these antifraud provisions, all
federal officials owe “a duty arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence” to the U.S. government and its citizens “with respect to
material, nonpublic information derived from such person’s
position . . . or gained from the performance of such person’s official

21.
See 60 Minutes: Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information? (CBS
television broadcast Nov. 13, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/830118560_162-57323527/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/ (stating in the
episode summary: “For now, the practice is perfectly legal, but some say it’s time for
the law to change”).
22.
See Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (included witness
testimony of Melanie Sloan, Donna M. Nagy, Donald C. Langevoort, John C. Coffee,
Jr., and Robert L. Walker); The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act:
Hearing on H.R. 1148 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011)
[hereinafter House STOCK Act Hearing] (included witness testimony of SEC Division
of Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami, Jack Markell, Donna M. Nagy, and Robert
L. Walker).
23.
See Robert Pear, Insider Trading Bill Clears Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2012, at A13. Less than two months before, President Barack Obama had urged the
Act’s passage. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 47 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100047/pdf/DCPD-201100047.pdf (“Send me a bill that bans
insider trading by Members of Congress. I will sign it tomorrow.”).
24.
STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).
25.
§§ 4(a), 9(b). Prior to the Act’s passage, securities law scholars had been
engaged in a spirited debate as to the (il)legality of congressional insider trading.
Compare Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of
Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2011) (contending that members of
Congress owe fiduciary-like duties to the federal government and concluding that
congressional insider trading constitutes securities fraud under existing law), with
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 285
(2011) (concluding that “the quirks of the relevant laws almost certainly would prevent
members of Congress from being successfully prosecuted”).
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responsibilities.”26 The STOCK Act therefore affirms a duty of loyalty
on the part of federal officials, which in turn provides the disclosure
obligation that renders a federal official’s insider trading or tipping a
fraudulent and deceptive act within the meaning of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.
Although the STOCK Act eliminates any doubt that Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 prohibit federal officials from defrauding the federal
government “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,”27
the new legislation does nothing to alter the existing judicial
construction of these provisions. Thus, contrary to views expressed by
some securities lawyers, the STOCK Act does not ban government
insiders “from divulging market-moving information to individuals who
could trade on it.”28 Rather, the same doctrinal analysis that determines
when tipping is fraudulent in the private sector now explicitly applies to
the public sector.
Through the late 1990s, however, the selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information by securities issuers had been an
intractable problem. For years, corporate executives routinely provided
securities analysts and professional investors with material nonpublic
information pertaining to their companies, including advance notice of
earnings announcements, product developments, and corporate
reorganizations.29 The privileged recipients of this information would
use it in deciding whether to purchase or sell the issuer’s securities, or
would pass the information along to hedge funds or other valued clients
who were likely to trade.30 While securities analysts often published
favorable reviews of the corporate officials who had doled out the
issuer’s material nonpublic information, quid pro quos between
securities analysts and chief executive officers (CEOs) or other
executives were almost always avoided.31
26.
§§ 4(b), 9(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g) to (h) (2012)). The
STOCK Act further specifies that members of Congress and congressional employees
owe a duty to Congress itself. § 4(b).
27.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
28.
Brody Mullins & Andrew Ackerman, New Bill Clouds Legality of Tips,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2012, at C1.
See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
29.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,677 (Aug.
15, 2000).
30.
See id.
31.
See generally Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital
Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533, 551–52 (2002); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale,
The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1035, 1054–61 (2003); William K.S. Wang, Selective Disclosure by Issuers, Its
Legality and Ex Ante Harm: Some Observations in Response to Professor Fox, 42 VA.
J. INT’L L. 869, 873–75 (2002); infra notes 287–290 and accompanying text.
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This routine practice of selective disclosure by securities issuers
had been viewed by many as “wrong, plain and simple,” to quote
former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur
Levitt.32 But that practice typically did not trigger securities fraud
liability because, according to the Supreme Court’s 1983 ruling in
Dirks v. SEC,33 selective disclosure by a corporate executive constitutes
fraudulent tipping only when that insider breaches a duty of trust and
confidence owed to the issuer and its shareholders by benefitting
personally, directly or indirectly, from the disclosure.34 Eschewing a
broader construction of fraud that would reduce securities analysts’
incentives to conduct research, Dirks insisted that “the purpose of the
disclosure” is key.35 Thus, absent their receipt of a personal benefit
which would evidence disloyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders, corporate executives could legally dribble out valuable
information to a favored few. Likewise, because Dirks instructs that a
tippee’s liability for securities fraud is derivative from that of the
tipper’s,36 those fortunate analysts who received the selective
disclosures could legally trade on that information or could advise their
clients to trade. CEOs and other executives would almost always have
legitimate corporate reasons for sharing material nonpublic information
with analysts and other market professionals. And SEC officials were
understandably reluctant to hang an illegal tipping or trading
prosecution on the tenuous thread that positive coverage for securities
issuers also inured to the personal benefit of their corporate insiders.37
Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD),38 which took effect in October
2000, eliminated the informational advantage traditionally possessed by
securities analysts and their clients.39 The SEC accomplished this feat
by creating new disclosure obligations on the part of SEC reporting
companies (often termed “publicly traded companies”) which operate
separate and apart from the antifraud provisions. These obligations
effectively require publicly traded companies to release material
32.
ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 87 (2002).
33.
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
34.
Id. at 661–62.
35.
Id. at 662.
36.
Id. at 659 (regarding a tippee as “a participant after the fact in the
insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty” (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
230 n.12 (1980)).
37.
But see infra notes 295–305 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s
settlement of a controversial enforcement action against Philip Stevens).
38.
See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2012).
39.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,680–81
(Aug. 15, 2000).
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nonpublic information to all investors at the same time. However,
several exceptions, including a promise on the part of the recipient to
maintain confidentiality, permit issuers to disclose information
selectively. With Regulation FD on the books for more than a decade,
Dirks’ “personal benefit” hurdle no longer serves to insulate the
practice of selective disclosure by corporate executives at publicly
traded companies.
Regulation FD, however, hardly squelched the desire among
professional investors for an informational edge in securities markets.
When privileged access to material nonpublic information could no
longer be provided legally by most securities issuers in the private
sector, hedge funds and other institutional traders began to search out
professionals who could gain access to other sources of market-moving
information, including sources in the public sector. Although at one
time these professionals with ties to the government were described in
the traditional Washington vernacular as “lobbyists,” that label soon
gave way to the term “political intelligence consultant.” Today, the
political-intelligence industry is the booming $100-million-a-year
business that set the stage for the hedge fund briefings by federal
officials that are referenced above.40
But, just as in the private sector, the Court’s decision in Dirks
effectively insulates from securities fraud liability most instances of
selective disclosure in the public sector. Indeed, federal officials
typically can point to legitimate reasons for sharing nonpublic
government information with outsiders, who often provide useful
feedback and policy analysis. Thus, the SEC (or the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in a criminal case) would rarely be able to demonstrate a
federal official’s misuse of information in breach of a duty of trust and
confidence, even under the broad misappropriation theory of insider
trading liability, which the Supreme Court endorsed in United States v.
O’Hagan.41 Like the link between favorable analyst coverage and
preferential access to nonpublic reports by a corporate CEO, enhanced
reputation and the mere possibility of future political support or
campaign contributions are unlikely to be regarded as quid pro quos
that constitute a federal official’s improper personal gain from the
disclosure of material nonpublic government information.42

40.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-20. For an extensive analysis of the
industry’s escalating influence, see Bud W. Jerke, Comment, Cashing in on Capitol
Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of Political Intelligence for Profit, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1451 (2010).
41.
521 U.S. 642, 652–59 (1997); see also infra notes 138–141 and
accompanying text.
42.
See infra Part I.B.3.

1294

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Moreover, material nonpublic information pertaining to
government and its operations implicates constitutional concerns
because federal officials, particularly those in Congress, are obligated
to discuss with constituents and other members of the public the
important issues of the day. These discussions traditionally have
received special protection under the First Amendment (and, for
Congress, perhaps also under the Speech or Debate Clause43). Thus,
even if many selective disclosures by federal officials theoretically
could be construed as fraudulent tipping under prior Court precedents
interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, constitutional considerations
would typically dictate a narrower construction of those antifraud
provisions.
Because selective disclosure by securities issuers in the private
sector and selective disclosure by federal officials in the public sector
affect securities markets in a similar manner and escape insider trading
regulation for much the same reason, a compelling case can be made
for a comparable solution. Specifically, our Article proposes a new
regime that would impose tighter internal controls on the ability of
federal officials to advantage some investors over others in securities
markets. We term this new regime FGD, which stands for “Fairer
Government Disclosure.” An FGD regime would differ substantially
from Regulation FD for publicly traded companies because it would
reflect the vast size as well as the unique challenges and operational
needs of the federal government. But like Regulation FD for publicly
traded companies, an FGD regime for the federal government would
focus on regulating “insiders and what they do . . . rather than on
policing information per se and its possession.”44
Our focus on selective disclosure by federal officials is particularly
important and timely because, as a possible precursor to further
legislative action, the STOCK Act requires the United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study and report to
Congress on the role of political intelligence in financial markets.45
Although each of us in prior writings has identified the need for a
Regulation FD analogue in the public sector46 and passing references to
43.
See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text.
44.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (quoting In re Investors Mgmt.
Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 648 (July 29, 1971)).
45.
See infra notes 231–233 and accompanying text.
46.
See PAINTER, supra note 4, at 171 (suggesting the possibility of a
“Regulation FD for government,” but acknowledging difficulties with its design and
implementation); Nagy, supra note 25, at 1163 n.320 (observing the parallels between
selective disclosure in the public and private sectors and stating that a “Regulation FD
analogue for elected officials is an intriguing possibility that warrants further
consideration”).
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the possibility have been made by others,47 this Article offers the first
detailed analysis as to what an FGD regime for the federal government
could look like. We proceed in three parts.
Part I explores the role of political intelligence in securities
markets and highlights instances, both historical and contemporary, of
selective disclosure to privileged investors. It then explains why most of
these instances fail to constitute fraudulent tipping within the meaning
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We conclude by critiquing legislative
efforts that go beyond the STOCK Act to require registration and
reporting by political intelligence firms and to further amend the federal
securities laws with a broad ban on securities trading on the basis of
material nonpublic government information. Both types of proposals,
though well intentioned, place unnecessary burdens on the private
sector when the problem of selective disclosure calls out for more
effective internal controls on federal officials.
Part II shifts the focus to selective disclosure by securities issuers
in the private sector and analyzes Regulation FD’s inventive solution to
the problem. Part II also discusses important concerns that were raised
by securities issuers, market professionals, and the media regarding the
proposed regulation’s possible chilling effect on the flow of corporate
information to securities markets, and it explains how the SEC
managed to ameliorate most of the concerns about chilling in its final
regulation. It concludes with a discussion of Regulation FD’s operations
and effectiveness over the last decade.
Part III explores the complexity of government disclosure and
suggests some ways in which the federal government can create a more
level playing field for all securities investors. As a starting place, we
propose seven FGD measures that federal officials can adopt either
47.
For example, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), a
nonpartisan watchdog group, recently published an article that queried: “Wouldn’t it be
nice if the federal government and members of Congress also had to treat all investors
equally, by adopting some public sector version of Reg FD?” Adam Zagorin, Wall
Street in Washington: Insider Access, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (Dec. 8,
2011),
http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/alerts/government-corruption/wall-street-inwashington-gc-ii-20111208.html. Even critics of the SEC’s decision to prohibit
selective disclosure by securities issuers have questioned the public sector’s lack of
restraint. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Why Isn’t the Federal Reserve Subject to
Regulation
FD?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Nov.
23,
2011),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/11/why-isnt-thefederal-reserve-subject-to-regulation-fd.html (pointing out that “[i]f the policy against
selective disclosure makes any sense, it ought to apply to the Fed as much as to private
issuers”); Larry Ribstein, Congressmen as Securities Traders, TRUTH ON THE MARKET
(Mar. 13, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/03/13/congressmen-as-securitiestraders/ (Congress can “[p]rotect against corruption by mandating disclosure not only
of trades but also tips. In other words, as little as I like Regulation FD, there might be
some benefit to imposing something like it on Congress.”).
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individually or through directives issued by agency heads and
congressional committees. We also begin a discussion as to how fairer
government disclosure can be implemented and enforced more
comprehensibly, without compromising the quality and timeliness of
disclosures to persons, including voters, who must have information in
order to make informed decisions.
I. SECURITIES TRADING BASED ON SELECTIVELY DISCLOSED
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
Since the days of its founding, the federal government has served
as a gold mine for material nonpublic information that could affect the
stock price of publicly traded corporations. The recent growth of the
political intelligence industry, however, leaves little doubt that this
mine is being tapped with increasing fervor and regularity. Although
selective disclosure by federal officials generally does not constitute
fraudulent tipping under the federal securities laws, the practice can and
should be curtailed. But each of the two types of proposals suggested
thus far—registration and disclosure requirements for political
intelligence consultants, and an explicit ban on securities trading on the
basis of nonpublic government information—attacks the problem from
the wrong direction.

A. The Role of Political Intelligence in Securities Markets
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While attention to the role of political intelligence in U.S.
securities markets is relatively new, investment profits from the use of
such intelligence can be traced back at least as far as 1789. At that
point in history, the First Congress had been poised to approve
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s plan to redeem at face value
Revolutionary War bonds, which were issued by the Continental
Congress and the states.48 With advance notice of Hamilton’s plan (an
effort intended, in large part, to boost the new federal government’s
48.
See Richard W. Painter, Ethics and Corruption in Business and
Government: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble and the Bank of the United States (U.
Minn. L. Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-32,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=920912 (published as the 2006 Fulton
Lecture in Legal History by the University of Chicago Law School) (citing RON
CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 225 (2004); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK,
THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 112–21 (1993)). A recent newspaper article also recounted
this incident. Kimberly Kindy, Congressional Rules on Trading Had Their Start in
1789, WASH. POST, June 23, 2012, at A14.
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credit rating), political allies and friends of the governing Federalists
bought large quantities of federal and state bonds, which had been
trading at thirty-to-forty percent of their face value.49 Senator William
Maclay of Pennsylvania, a Democrat, opposed Hamilton’s debt
proposal and the insider trading that went along with it.50 Most of his
ire was directed at colleagues in Congress who themselves traded on
the information that the Treasury had provided to them.51 But Maclay
made it clear that many speculators on the outside were also trading on
the informational advantage that other investors lacked. As Maclay
wrote in his journal: “Mr. Hazard has followed buying [bond]
certificates for some time past. He told me he had made a business of
it; it is easy to guess for whom. I told him, ‘You are, then, among the
happy few who have been let into the secret.’ He seemed
abashed . . . .”52
Maclay was recounting his conversation with Jonathan J. Hazard,
Rhode Island’s delegate to the Continental Congress in 1788, and
Maclay had no doubt that “all commotion originated from the
Treasury.”53 Maclay’s journal further reveals that prior to their bond
purchases, many of the speculators met with members of Congress in
an attempt to influence the outcome of the vote on whether to approve
Hamilton’s plan.54 Accordingly, in the words of a modern historian,
“[t]he evidentiary record points toward the conclusion that the first
market for government securities was created by interested parties with
special information.”55
Congress, when it created the Department of the Treasury,
responded to this bond trading scandal with a statute, apparently aimed
at Hamilton. The statute, which is still in force today, provided that the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer may not “be concerned in
the purchase or disposal of any public securities of any State, or the
United States” while in office, and that an officer who violates this
provision shall be fined “three thousand dollars, and shall . . . be

49.
50.
51.
52.

See Painter, supra note 48.
See id.
See id.

JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY: UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM
PENNSYLVANIA 1789–1791 at 174 (Frederick Ungar Publishing 1965) (1890).
53.
Id. at 175.
54.
Id. at 323 (“[T]he assumption [of the continental debt and of the states’
debts] was forced on us to favor the views of speculation. . . . The whole town almost
has been busy at it; and, of course, all engaged in influencing the measures of
Congress.”).
55.
Howard M. Wachtel, Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of Wall Street
10 (1996) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=15091.

1298

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

removed from office, and forever thereafter incapable of holding any
office under the United States.”56 The provision was intended to
prevent these two Treasury officials from “speculating in the public
funds.”57 The use of the statutory language “concerned with” could be
construed to cover tipping as well as trading by the Secretary and the
Treasurer, although the reach of the statute has never been tested in
court. The statute, however, said nothing about members of Congress
speculating in Treasury securities or tipping others, nor did it directly
address selective disclosure of Treasury Department information to
securities investors.
Between 1789 and the present day, federal officials have been in
possession of enormous amounts of material nonpublic information
about government operations and decisions. On some occasions,
market-moving information specifically designated as confidential has
been clandestinely leaked in the course of schemes that amounted to
bribery, such as in 1869, when famed speculators in gold apparently
paid a Treasury official $10,000 for inside tips as to the timing of gold
sales from the federal government’s own stash.58 Other notorious
tipping scandals are discussed in the Section that follows,59 including a
1905 incident at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
involving confidential cotton crop estimate reports that were leaked to
commodities traders.60 The USDA scandal even prompted specific

56.
Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, 67 (1789) (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 329 (2000)).
57.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 635 (1789) (statement of the bill sponsor, Rep.
Aedanus Burke).
58.
See KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, THE GOLD RING: JIM FISK, JAY GOULD, AND
BLACK FRIDAY, 1869 (1988). As Ackerman explains, the famed speculators used
President Ulysses Grant’s brother-in-law, Abel Corbin, to persuade the President to
appoint a Civil War hero, General Daniel Butterfield, as Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury. See id. at 75–76. Butterfield’s job was to sell the federal government’s gold
into the trading markets. See id. at 93. Not only did the speculators pay Butterfield to
provide them with advance information as to the government’s anticipated sales, but
they also used Grant’s brother-in-law to persuade the Administration to delay the sale of
its gold. See id. at 95. The speculators then started buying, driving up the price of
gold, expecting to sell in advance of the government. See id. at 95–96. President Grant
and his Treasury Secretary, however, got wind of the scheme and ordered an abrupt
sale of $4 million in gold into the market, with a contemporaneous press release. See
id. at 186–87. The gold market plunged from $160 to $133 in a single day (now known
as “Black Friday”), which precipitated a broad-based market panic, followed by a
lengthy economic recession. Id. at 184–91. Congress subsequently investigated this
gold conspiracy and Butterfield claimed that his $10,000 payment had been an
unsecured real estate loan. See id. at 77.
59.
See infra Part I.B.1.
60.
See infra notes 128–133 and accompanying text (discussing Haas v.
Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910)).
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“lock-up” procedures at the agency designed to control the premature
release of confidential crop estimate reports.61
But many parts of the federal government do not take lock-up or
similar precautions to guard against the selective release of confidential
information and, in any event, much nonpublic market-moving
information has not been explicitly designated as “confidential.”62
Accordingly, toward the last two decades of the twentieth century, the
gathering of “political intelligence” from the federal government for
stock trading purposes was on its way to becoming a sophisticated
industry. In the 1980s, for example, the stock arbitrageur Ivan Boesky
is reported to have “hired a team of lobbyists in Washington to tell him
if Congress would block Standard Oil Co.’s takeover of Gulf Corp.”63
When Boesky was told that this merger would be approved, he
purchased stock and profited mightily. Although he later pled guilty to
a role in one of Wall Street’s biggest insider-trading scandals
(embroiling a host of investment bankers and lawyers who were
effectively selling their client’s confidential information to Boesky and
other traders), neither Boesky nor his government sources were ever
prosecuted for “tips received in Washington.”64
2. THE POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE INDUSTRY
As the 1990s came to a close, those lobbyists who specialized in
gathering information concerning legislative and regulatory
developments began to be termed “political intelligence consultants.”
These specialized consultants soon expanded into a thriving industry, in
large part because of the growth of hedge funds, which are particularly
aggressive in seeking out private meetings with federal officials for the
purpose of gathering information for trading.65 In addition, when
Regulation FD brought the private sector’s routine practices of selective
disclosure to a halt after 2000, hedge funds and other professional

61.
See RICH ALLEN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SAFEGUARDING AMERICA’S
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS: A CENTURY OF SUCCESSFUL AND SECURE PROCEDURES,
1905–2005 at 1–2 (2007); infra notes 403–405 and accompanying text (discussing steps
taken by federal agencies to prevent premature release of market-sensitive data).
62.
See PAINTER, supra note 4, at 63–65.
63.
Mullins & Scannell, supra note 15.
64.
Id.
65.
See PAINTER, supra note 4, at 167–69 (discussing the proliferation of
hedge funds with operations in and around Washington D.C., presumably set up for the
purpose of acquiring and trading on nonpublic government information); Javers, supra
note 15; Jerke, supra note 40, at 1471–74 (discussing the “[r]ise of [p]olitical
[i]ntelligence [g]athering”); Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 15; Mullins & Scannell,
supra note 15; Snyder, supra note 15.
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investors began to focus more attention on market-moving nonpublic
information from the public sector.
There is no doubt that the ability to deliver political intelligence
commands big money. Less than a year ago, it was reported that
“[t]housands of political insiders are being paid by hedge funds,
private-equity firms and other big investors,” resulting in a
“$100-million a year business in Washington.”66 Some clients pay
Gerson Lehrman, often depicted as the largest so-called expert network
firm, “up to $240,000 a year for unlimited access to the Washington
experts.”67 The political insiders employed by these networks, lobbying
firms, or law firms, as well as those consultants who work
independently, are typically former officials in executive departments
or agencies or former staffers on Capitol Hill, although many retired
members of Congress also serve as political consultants.68
Up until the 60 Minutes episode that fueled the STOCK Act’s
passage,69 providers of political intelligence were not at all bashful
about their services. For example, the law firm Sonnenschein Nath &
Rosenthal once boasted on its web site: “While Congress negotiated
significant pension reform legislation behind closed doors, our clients
relied on our political intelligence gathering to inform them of the
resolution of key outstanding issues that could affect their
investments.”70 This advertisement emphasized the value of the firm’s
political intelligence gathering not for legal work or lobbying, but for
investing. As the firm’s then-chairman underscored, “[t]here are a lot
of savvy investors who have realized that there is a lot of money to be
made from what Congress does.”71 Many other D.C. law firms and
consulting firms have highlighted their political intelligence activities

66.
67.
68.

Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 15.

Id.
See, e.g., Kristin Jensen et al., Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists for Inside
Tips on U.S. Legislation, BLOOMBERG (March 16, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aYbb6sQ4HmGc&refer=us
(observing
that
former-Senator John Breaux, “a Louisiana Democrat, is one of a growing cadre of
lobbyists being hired by U.S. hedge funds to provide instant tips on the progress of
potentially market-moving legislation”); Brody Mullins, Wall Street, Washington, and
Gingrich, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203721704577156814083892408.html (reporting that former-House
Speaker Newt Gingrich arranged private meetings in May 2011 between analysts at
Credit Suisse Group and senior Republican congressional health-care policy staffers).
69.
See 60 Minutes, supra note 21.
70.
Jerke, supra note 40, at 1471 (internal citation omitted).
71.
Mullins & Scannell, supra note 15 (quoting Elliot Portnoy who, according
to the article, was elected as Sonnenschein’s chairman partly based on the performance
of the firm’s political intelligence practice, which he founded).
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and have spoken with the media about their clients.72 As one firm’s
principal candidly acknowledged, hedge funds “are not paying me to
lobby,” they are “paying me for information.”73 Foreign investors,
including governments, also can get access to market-moving
information from the federal government by buying a Washington D.C.
political intelligence firm, as a government-run Chinese finance
company apparently did in 2005.74 Because they are not seeking to
influence legislation, political intelligence firms and consultants
currently do not have to register under the Lobbying Disclosure Act
(LDA),75 but that could change in a year’s time once the GAO
completes its report to Congress on the role of political intelligence in
financial markets.76
3. SELECTIVE DISCLOSURES PROFILED IN THE MEDIA
Several examples of selective disclosure that have been profiled in
the media confirm the ubiquity of political intelligence activity. In
2005, for instance, the SEC launched an informal inquiry into possible
selective disclosures pertaining to a speech made by then-Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.).77 The speech announced his
support for legislation that would have created a $140 billion trust fund
for asbestos liability claims.78 The SEC’s concerns were prompted by
noticeable spikes in trading volume and stock prices—in the two days
prior to the speech—for several companies with substantial exposure to
asbestos lawsuits.79 Press reports posited that hedge fund traders had
obtained advanced information about the Majority Leader’s speech

72.
See Jerke, supra note 40, at 1473 (discussing examples of advertisements
and media interviews involving “Patton Boggs LLP, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal
LLP, Washington Analysis, Podesta Mattoon, Cormac Group, Mehlman Vogel
Castagnetti Inc., Bryan Cave Strategies LLC, DLA Piper, Williams & Jensen, and
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP”).
73.
Jensen et al., supra note 68 (quoting former legislative aide Jonathan
Slade, a principal with the Washington-based Cormac Group).
74.
See Javers, supra note 15, at 42 (reporting that Washington Analysis was
sold in July 2005 “to China’s Xinhua Finance, which is 6.5%-owned by the
government-controlled Xinhua News Agency”).
75.
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
76.
See infra Part I.C.1.
77.
See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 15 (reporting that the SEC “is looking
into whether laws are being broken somewhere in the transfer of information between
Congress and Wall Street”).
Id.
78.
79.
See Jerke, supra note 40, at 1453–55 (explaining that W.R. Grace, Crown
Holdings, and USG Corporation “had used asbestos materials in manufacturing and that
had been mired in litigation for years”).
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from political intelligence firms, who obtained that information from
congressional insiders.80 Although no one was ever charged with
violating the insider trading or tipping prohibitions arising under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and many relevant facts remain
unknown, much can be gained from exploring a counterfactual. The
timing and the substance of Senator Frist’s speech may not have been
explicitly confidential pursuant to a formal rule, internal policy, or
other mandate, but it almost certainly constituted material information
(i.e., there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider it important in making an investment decision81) as well as
nonpublic information (i.e., it had not been disclosed “to achieve a
broad dissemination to the investing public generally”82). Thus, even if
an SEC inquiry had revealed the selective disclosure of material
nonpublic information, the principal legal question for the agency
would have been whether congressional insiders misappropriated this
information from the federal government by sharing it with political
intelligence consultants and their clients who traded securities. As we
shall see, the answer to this misappropriation question turns on whether
the congressional insiders can be said to have misused material
nonpublic congressional information for an improper personal benefit.
Another much-publicized example of government selective
disclosure occurred in July 2008, when Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson is reported to have met privately with several hedge fund
managers and investment bankers and to have shared advance plans for
a partial government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.83 What
80.
See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 15; Javers, supra note 15, at 42
(stating that “the news got to key Wall Street players a day early via . . . a small group
of firms specializing in ‘political intelligence’ that mine the capital for information and
translate Washington wonkspeak into trading tips”).
81.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). Moreover, when
information is “soft” or contingent, its materiality is to be judged by “a balancing of
both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of
the event” in light of the totality of facts and circumstances. Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)). For further
discussion of materiality and its interplay with a so-called mosaic theory, see infra note
348 and accompanying text.
82.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.12 (1983) (quoting In re Faberge,
Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (May 25, 1973)). The Second Circuit has also recognized that
information may be deemed public, even though it is known only by some in the
market, if securities trading “has caused the information to be fully impounded into the
price of the particular stock.” United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir.
1993). For further discussion of when information is “nonpublic,” see infra notes
339–344and accompanying text.
83.
Richard Teitelbaum, How Paulson Gave Hedge Funds Advance Word of
Fannie Mae Rescue, BLOOMBERG MKTS. MAG., Nov. 29, 2011, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-29/how-henry-paulson-gave-hedge-funds-
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he said at this meeting apparently differed in tone and substance from
his public statements that these two companies would not be taken
over.84 It is not clear why Secretary Paulson had the meeting or
believed it important to reveal the information. Nor is it clear whether
any of the attendees did, in fact, trade securities on the basis of the
information.85 But it does not appear that anyone at the meeting had
been instructed not to trade.86 As the SEC did with the possible
selective disclosures relating to Senator Frist’s planned asbestos speech,
it appears that the agency is now investigating securities transactions by
the firms that were represented at the meeting with Secretary Paulson.87

advance-word-of-2008-fannie-mae-rescue.html (reporting that “[a]round the conference
room table were a dozen or so hedge-fund managers and other Wall Street executives—
at least five of them alumni of Goldman Sachs”).
84.
See id. (reporting that Paulson described “a possible scenario for placing
Fannie and Freddie into ‘conservatorship’” and stating that one hedge fund attendee
“was shocked that Paulson would furnish such specific information—to his mind,
leaving little doubt that the Treasury Department would carry out the plan”).
85.
See id. (explaining that it is not possible to track firm-specific short stock
sales using public documents, although the SEC can track at least some short stock
sales).
86.
See id. (positing that those attending the meeting were “given a choice
opportunity to trade on that information”).
87.
See Juliet Chung & Jean Eaglesham, Global Finance: Trades after 2008
Meeting Probed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2012, at C3 (reporting that Taconic Capital
Advisors “notified investors last week that it received a subpoena related to the meeting
. . . [and that the firm] believe[d] that its conduct has been proper in all respects”). As
infra Part I.B elaborates, in the absence of evidence of an agreement by the firms to
retain the confidentiality of the information revealed at the meeting or a history,
pattern, or practice of sharing such confidences with Secretary Paulson, Rule 10b-5
almost certainly would not have prohibited the firms from trading securities (assuming,
of course, that Paulson did not personally derive an improper benefit from any of this
selective disclosure to the firms). That said, if investment bank or hedge fund
employees had used the alleged disclosures about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for
personal gain in connection with their own securities trading (as opposed to trading for
the benefit of the bank or hedge fund), those employees could possibly be subject to
Rule 10b-5 liability under the misappropriation theory for defrauding their employer
and its clients or investors. See Rosenberg, Litigation Release No. 12986, 49 SEC
Docket 1373, 1991 WL 296668 (Sept. 24, 1991) (announcing settlement of Rule 10b-5
action against general partner and securities analyst at Cowen & Co., who allegedly
sold his entire personal holding of nearly 11,000 shares of stock in an issuer after its
CEO selectively disclosed negative material nonpublic information). The Rosenberg
release states that the respondent “did not communicate the information that he learned”
from the issuer’s CEO to Cowen & Co. or its clients prior to the issuer’s public
announcement, and that Rosenberg’s personal gain from his stock sales breached “a
duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence that he had with Cowen and
Cowen’s clients.” Id. at *1. To be sure, nothing reported in the media suggests that the
SEC is investigating personal securities transactions in connection with the Paulson
meeting. But in any event, when material nonpublic government information is at issue,
the SEC might well refrain from charging employees with a Rule 10b-5 violation
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As the financial crisis dragged on, hedge funds and professional
investors were also reported to be bullish on tips from the Federal
Reserve (“the Fed”).88 Although the Fed has specific rules that prohibit
officials from disclosing confidential Fed actions that have not yet been
made public, well-connected analysts and investors can often “glean[]
clues about the thinking of Fed officials during private talks.”89 For
example, in the course of an August 15, 2011 meeting with Chairman
Ben Bernanke in his office, one consultant apparently deduced that the
Fed would be pushing down long-term interest rates by selling
medium-term bonds and using the proceeds to buy long-term bonds (a
1960s-era strategy known as “Operation Twist”).90 Selective disclosures
may have been made to other consultants as well because there were
sharp increases in the prices for long-term bonds in the five-week
period before the official public announcement of Operation Twist on
September 21.91 The stark contrast between Regulation FD’s
prohibition of selective disclosure in the private sector and the lax
standards applicable to the public sector prompted one securities law
scholar to post on his blog: “[I]f private issuers shouldn’t be giving
select investors an informational advantage, shouldn’t the same
principle apply to the government?”92 Since then, however, both the
Fed and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have taken steps to
increase transparency and reduce the likelihood of selective
disclosure.93
The Department of Defense (DOD) is yet another outlet for those
seeking to mine political intelligence. To be sure, much information
from the DOD is expressly classified as confidential and a federal
official’s disclosure of such information to outsiders can often be
prosecuted as a crime.94 But privileged investors may sometimes gain
premised on the counterintuitive notion that an investment bank or hedge fund has an
exclusive right to the use of a federal official’s selective disclosure.
88.
Susan Pulliam, Investors Bullish on Fed Tips, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23,
2011, at A1.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. (reporting that after her meeting with Chairman Ben Bernanke, Nancy
Lazar, an economist with International Strategies & Investment Group, Inc., “made a
hasty call to investor clients”).
91.
Id.
92.
See Bainbridge, supra note 47.
93.
See infra notes 393–396 and accompanying text (discussing the Fed’s
recent decision to publicly disclose federal funds rate forecasts for its policy committee
members and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s recent decision to post on its
website the surveys it sends to major financial firms ahead of monetary-policy
meetings).
94.
See Scott Shane, Inquiry of Leaks Is Casting Chill over Coverage, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, at A1 (discussing “the most sweeping” criminal investigation in
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access to other types of nonpublic information that could affect the
stock price of publicly traded companies, such as Lockheed-Martin,
Boeing, Northrop-Grumman, or other military contractors of a smaller
size. A New York Times columnist, for instance, has sharply critiqued
what he claimed was the growing practice of officials at the Pentagon
“sidling up to” institutional investors and securities analysts
specializing in the military industry.95 He recounted, in particular, a
private meeting between the DOD’s Deputy Secretary and a dozen or
so Wall Street analysts in October 2010, which “lay[ed] out the
Pentagon’s cost-cutting plans in astonishing detail,”96 and a breakfast
speech delivered by the DOD’s Undersecretary for Acquisitions at a
military industry investment conference in February 2011 with T. Rowe
Price and other large institutional investors in attendance.97 The
episodes prompted the columnist to ask: “If you were an investor in the
military industry, would you find this useful information? You bet—this
is the stuff that can move markets.”98 The DOD insists that “nothing
new was divulged during the [analyst] session” in October 2010,99 and
the text of the February 2011 breakfast speech can be found on a DOD
website.100 But unless the information that was discussed with the
analysts or shared in the breakfast speech had already been disclosed

years into intelligence disclosures made to the media, “which has reached into the
White House, the Pentagon, the National Security Agency and the C.I.A.”); infra note
411 (citing the Supreme Court’s decision in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers case)).
95.
Joe Nocera, From Pentagon, A Buy Rating on Contractors, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2011, at B1.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. According to Nocera, the attendees at the conference were told that
“the Pentagon would frown on mergers among the five giant military contractors [but]
. . . was going to encourage mergers among smaller military contractors. And, . . . ‘[it
would] be attentive’ to innovative smaller companies that provide services (as opposed
to weapons systems) to the Pentagon.” Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. As Nocera observes, Reuters “uncovered the meeting” and reported on
it a few days after it occurred. Id. According to that Reuters report, the analysts at
“Friday’s closed-door meeting in New York” were “sworn to secrecy, but sources
familiar with the proceeding said [the Deputy Defense Secretary] faced tough questions
about future profit margins and the Pentagon’s ability to maintain a choice of suppliers
given decreased demand for weapons.” Andrea Shalal-Esa, Pentagon Pitches Austerity
Plan to Nervous Wall St., REUTERS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010, 3:24 AM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/10/05/arms-wallstreet-idINN0521646520101005.
100. See Ashton B. Carter, Undersecretary of Def. for Acquisition, Tech., and
Logistics, Remarks at Cowen Investment Conference: The Defense Industry Enters a
New Era (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/
USD_AT&L__Cowen_Speech_020911.pdf.
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“to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public generally,”101
the DOD may well have accorded the analysts and institutional
investors an investment edge.102
Even agencies such as the DOE and CMS can be focal points for
valuable political intelligence when their regulatory initiatives affect
publicly traded companies. Last summer, prompted by concerns that
DOE officials may have selectively disclosed nonpublic market-moving
information that was used for securities trading, Senator Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa) began an investigation into possible leaks.103 Among
other matters, the senator questioned whether a well-known hedge fund
manager, who had been shorting stock in for-profit colleges, may have
received nonpublic information from DOE officials pertaining to the
imposition of new regulations—a so-called gainful employment rule
aimed at for-profit colleges.104 The senator set out eight questions in a
letter to DOE Secretary Arne Duncan, including one that inquired:
“[W]hat internal controls does the Department have to ensure that
non-public information is not leaked to [investors in for-profit
institutions] and that these investors do not influence the Department’s
policies?”105 As Senator Grassley’s letter reflects, the hedge fund
manager may have been lobbying the DOE for a regulatory crackdown
on for-profit colleges at the same time as he was shorting their stock,
which would raise concerns about other possible market abuses.106 Less

101. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (quoting the SEC’s test for when
information can be deemed to be in the public realm).
102. Cf. infra notes 339–344 and accompanying text (discussing SEC guidance
in Regulation FD’s adopting release as to how issuers can make “public disclosures”
and subsequent SEC guidance as to whether postings on corporate websites can be
deemed publicly disseminated for purposes of Regulation FD).
103. Ben Protess, Grassley Questions Education Agency’s Ties to Hedge
Funds,
N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(July
28,
2011,
10:02
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/grassley-questions-education-agencys-ties-towall-street/.
104. Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to Arne Duncan, DOE Secretary (July
available
at
26,
2011)
[hereinafter
Grassley
DOE
Letter],
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/DuncanLetter.pdf. Senator Grassley’s
letter quotes an e-mail from hedge fund manager Steve Eisman to DOE officials that
was obtained by FOIA requests filed by public interest groups. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The nonprofit legal watchdog group, Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington (CREW), sent letters to the SEC and the DOJ raising questions
about the fairness of DOE’s regulatory process as well as investors’ efforts to influence
DOE regulations for their own personal gain. See Press Release, Citizens for
Responsibility & Ethics in Washington, CREW Provides SEC New Information about
Short-Sellers’ Efforts to Shape Education Regulations (Mar. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.citizensforethics.org/press/entry/crew-provides-sec-new-info-short-sellersshaping-education-regulation.
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than six months later, in December 2011, Senator Grassley launched a
second inquiry into possible incidents of selective disclosure, this time
at the CMS.107 In a letter to the CMS’s Acting Administrator requesting
responses to nineteen questions, the senator revealed that “[a]
whistleblower within CMS has alleged that high level CMS employees
attended lengthy information gathering briefings at the request of hedge
funds and political intelligence brokers with no discernible benefit to
CMS or the Federal government.”108 He was frank in expressing his
concern about “a continuing pattern in which CMS officials . . . under
the cover of reaching out and meeting with stakeholders, have
disseminated information to well-connected lobbyists in non-public
settings.”109
Also in 2011, the U.S. credit rating—established by Alexander
Hamilton more than 220 years ago110—was placed at risk, and much
material nonpublic information had been swirling around Washington as
to whether and when the government would resolve the debt-ceiling
crisis.111 Although the media fueled speculation about possible
repercussions from the ballooning national debt, specific details about a
credit rating downgrade were not made public until August 5, 2011,
when S&P announced its decision to reduce the federal government’s
rating from AAA to AA+.112 The abnormally high volume of securities
trading that preceded the announcement prompted an SEC investigation
into whether officials—perhaps at S&P, but conceivably at the Treasury
Department—may have selectively disclosed advance information about
the downgrade.113
A final example of media-profiled selective disclosure returns full
circle to Congress. In December 2011, in the wake of congressional
hearings on the STOCK Act, the Wall Street Journal featured a front
page report on the “network of brokers, lobbyists and political insiders
who arrange private meetings” between hedge fund managers and
107. Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to Marilyn Tavenner, CMS Acting
Adm’r (Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Grassley CMS Letter], available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/GrassleyCMSLetter_Dec2011.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
111. See Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 20 (reporting that political intelligence
consultants arranged Capitol Hill meetings on topics including “whether political
deadlock debate would lead to a U.S. default”).
112. See Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Probes Rating-Cut Trades; Regulators
Subpoena Hedge Funds, Others over Actions ahead of S&P Downgrade, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2011, at A1; Kim Peterson, Who Leaked the S&P Downgrade News?, MSN
MONEY (Aug. 12, 2011, 2:27 PM), http://money.msn.com/exchange-tradedfund/article.aspx?post=77dc9185-ed4f-4b98-bdba-6b818b601f86.
113. See Eaglesham, supra note 112; Peterson, supra note 112.
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members of Congress or their legislative aides.114 The article depicted
the hedge fund managers as “a select group who pay[s] for early,
firsthand reports on Capitol Hill” and contended that “[s]eeking
advance word of government decisions is part of a growing, lucrative—
and legal—practice.”115 A number of specific incidents were recounted,
including briefings arranged by the Wall Street firm of JNK Securities
that occurred on December 8, 2009.116 The briefings took place in the
Capitol Building, hours before the public announcement of the brokered
compromise that eliminated the proposed government insurance option
in the Senate bill that later became the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (often referred to as “Obamacare”).117 The Wall
Street Journal acknowledged that none of the hedge funds who “were
let in on the deal” would “publicly divulge how they used the
information.”118 But it speculated that the “news was potentially worth
millions of dollars” to the attendees at the briefings because the deal
helped boost the share price of Aetna, Cigna, and other large national
insurers that would have faced competition from a government-run
insurance plan.119 It further reported that JNK Securities had organized
“more than 200 similar sessions over the past three years” on a wide
range of other topics.120 The legislators who were interviewed defended
the JNK sessions and other briefings and meetings as a means of
gathering valuable feedback and analysis from the investment
community.121

114. Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 20.
115. Id.
116. Id. (describing JNK Securities as “one of the most aggressive of the
dozens of companies that escort clients around Capitol Hill”).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (stating that meeting topics ranged from “how Congress would weigh
in on the proposed merger between Express Scripts Inc. and Medco Health Solutions
Inc.” to “whether political deadlock [during the debt-ceiling debate] would lead to a
U.S. default”). Although hedge funds no longer pay fees to JNK Securities for
arranging the meetings, “[i]f they use information gleaned at these face-to-face
meetings they are expected to execute trades through the brokerage firm, which collects
commissions.” Id.
121. Id. (“Republicans say they seek the view of hedge fund managers to help
shape laws that spur investment. Democrats say the conversations lead to better public
policy because investors tell them about loopholes, inefficiencies or unseen
consequences of existing laws.”).
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B. Fraudulent Tipping vs. Unfair Selective Disclosure
Notwithstanding the potentially valuable feedback and insights that
can stem from meetings with political intelligence consultants, hedge
fund managers, and other professional investors, the selective
disclosure of market-moving government information places ordinary
investors at a significant disadvantage in the securities markets. But as
this Section will explain, most selective disclosures—including virtually
all of the examples discussed in the prior Section—are unlikely to
constitute fraudulent tipping under the federal securities laws.
Moreover, because liability for fraudulent trading on tips is derivative,
the privileged recipients of selectively disclosed government
information are generally free to use it to trade securities. Although the
recently enacted STOCK Act makes explicit that Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 apply to members of Congress and all other federal officials and
employees, the Act does nothing to alter controlling judicial
interpretations as to what constitutes fraud under these provisions.
Thus, to distinguish between fraudulent tipping on the one hand and
unfair selective disclosure on the other, we must turn to the case law.
1. PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING TIPS BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS
We have no doubt that the vast majority of federal officials who
have shared material nonpublic information with securities investors did
so for reasons consistent with their duties of trust and confidence to the
federal government and its citizens. Yet, history reveals some rogue
government officials who divulged market-moving information to
outsiders for purposes that were undisputably disloyal. In the particular
instances recounted below, the federal officials who tipped and/or their
accomplices who traded were prosecuted for conduct that today would
violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (or the Commodity Exchange Act,
when the trading involves commodities).122 Even before these laws were
122. Unlike the federal securities laws, under which insider trading is
prosecuted as a species of fraud, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) expressly
prohibits certain types of insider trading in commodities markets. In 2010, Congress
amended Section 6c(a) of the CEA to explicitly ban commodities insider trading (and
tipping) based on nonpublic information misappropriated from a government source. 7
U.S.C.S. § 6c(a) (LexisNexis 2010). This was done in response to a specific request by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). See Hearing to Review

Implementation of Changes to the Commodity Exchange Act Contained in the 2008
Farm Bill: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Farm Commodities & Risk Mgmt.
of the H. Comm. on Agric., 111th Cong. 2–6 (2010) (statement of Gary Gensler,
CFTC Chairman). The new CEA provision has been described as the “Eddie Murphy”
rule, an allusion to the actor’s starring role in Trading Places, a movie involving
scheming brothers who are seeking to profit from trades in frozen concentrated orange
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in place, however, federal officials who enabled outsiders to profit in
financial markets could be prosecuted under criminal statutes
proscribing fraudulent conspiracies against the United States.
The Second Circuit’s relatively recent decision in United States v.
Royer123 describes one highly publicized prosecution for illegal tipping
and trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Jeffrey Royer, a
former FBI agent, had been convicted and sentenced to six years in
prison for leaking confidential FBI information to Tony Elgindy.124
Elgindy, who was also convicted and sentenced to prison, used the
FBI’s information to short the stock of publicly traded companies under
investigation, effectively betting on a market price decline.125 In
denying their appeal, the Second Circuit pointed to the jury’s finding
that “the defendants unlawfully traded in various securities on the basis
of material confidential information that Royer had misappropriated and
then shared with Elgindy for the purpose of securities trading.”126 As an
employee of the FBI, Royer stood in a relationship of trust and
confidence with the agency and he breached this duty of loyalty when
he disclosed its confidential data expecting to receive a share of the
trading profits as well as a lucrative private sector job “making a
million dollars a year” with Elgindy.127
In 1905—nearly a century before Royer and three decades before
Congress sought to regulate the financial markets—a tipping and trading
scandal occurred at the USDA. The prosecution eventually reached the
Supreme Court in Haas v. Henkel,128 where the Justices reviewed an
indictment charging the defendants with a conspiracy to obtain crop
reports from a USDA statistician “in advance of general publicity and
to use such information in speculating upon the cotton market.”129 The
Court concluded that the conspiracy, if proven, would have defrauded
“the United States by defeating, obstructing and impairing it in the
exercise of its governmental function in the regular and official duty of
juice futures contracts using an illicitly obtained USDA orange crop report. Id. at 7; see
also infra notes 128–133 and accompanying text (discussing the real life 1905 tipping
scandal involving a misappropriated USDA cotton crop report). As part of the STOCK
Act, Congress amended the CEA to make explicitly clear that Section 4(c)(a) extends to
members of Congress and congressional employees, as well as to judicial officers and
judicial employees, both with respect to tipping and trading. See STOCK Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-105, § 5, 126 Stat. 291, 293 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (2012)).
123. 549 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008).
124. Id. at 890–91.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 897.
127. Brief for the United States at 150, United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886
(2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4081-CR), 2007 WL 6506774.
128. 216 U.S. 462 (1910).
129. Id. at 478.
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publicly promulgating fair, impartial and accurate reports concerning
the cotton crop.”130 A USDA investigation of the scandal later revealed
that a bureau chief had suspected that something was amiss, and had
decreed that the statistician and two other employees were not to leave
their work areas until the cotton report had been publicly
disseminated.131 But the sly statistician and his commodities trading
partner were hardly deterred. The investigation uncovered that they had
“worked out a signal system using a particular window blind to indicate
the level of the figure to be published.”132 The USDA statistician was
ultimately sentenced to a fine of $5000.133
At least four other federal government insiders have been charged
with unlawfully communicating material nonpublic government
information to outsiders who traded securities based on that
information. These include: a former FDA chemist and his son, who in
2011 were charged with trading stocks of drug companies based on
unreleased drug approval determinations (though prosecutors
subsequently dismissed the securities fraud charges involving the
son);134 a former director of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, who
in 1989 admitted that he had regularly disclosed nonpublic information
about the Fed’s discount rate to a securities brokerage firm;135 a former

130. Id.
131. See ALLEN, supra note 61, at 1–2.
132. Id. at 2. The statistician, E.F. Holmes, and his trading partner “apparently
estimated a probable level for the national figure and if the actual total was close to
their estimate Holmes raised the window blind to the middle of the window. If the total
was higher or lower, Holmes adjusted the blind based on the scale they had contrived.”

Id.

133. Id.
134. See Cheng Yi Liang, Litigation Release No. 22,171 (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22171.htm (announcing that a former
FDA chemist consented to the entry of an injunction and agreed to pay disgorgement of
$3,776,152, which was deemed satisfied by the forfeiture order entered as part of his
guilty plea in the parallel criminal case); David S. Hilzenrath, Former FDA Chemist
Sentenced to 5 Years for Insider Trading, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2012, at A13
(reporting that the chemist’s son “was arrested on accusations of securities fraud, his
computer was seized, and he was later sentenced to just over a year in prison for
possession of child pornography”).
135. Joseph F. Sullivan, A Former Official of Federal Bank Indicted as Insider,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1988, at A1 (reporting allegations by then-United States Attorney
Samuel Alito that Robert Rough’s tips “enabled the securities firm to ‘fraudulently
make millions in profits and avoid millions of dollars in trading losses’” and that, in
return, “the company gave Mr. Rough $47,000 in interest-deferred loans, which were
repaid”); Shift by U.S. in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1989, at D12 (reporting
that in exchange for Rough’s plea to one count of bank fraud, “[t]he Government
agreed to drop six other counts, including insider trading, and . . . agreed to
recommend a prison term of less than a year”); Fed Ex-Official Gets 6 Months, N.Y.
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branch chief of the SEC’s corporation finance division, who in 1966
communicated nonpublic information about a confidential investigation
to a securities trader who had “procur[ed] female company” for the
SEC staffer’s benefit;136 and a former law clerk to Supreme Court
Justice Joseph McKenna, who was the subject of a dismissed
prosecution in 1919 for allegedly tipping others who traded securities
based on information pertaining to an unreleased Court decision.137
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
O’Hagan did not address directly the question of tipping, its
misappropriation theory provides a clear roadmap for what prosecutors
must now prove to establish Rule 10b-5 liability in cases against federal
officials for illegally tipping. Under O’Hagan, “a person commits fraud
‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to

TIMES, Sept. 14, 1989, at D7 (reporting Rough’s sentence of six months in prison and
200 hours of community service during two years of probation).
The Rough incident was not the only tipping scandal to beset the Federal Reserve.
Over a three-year-period from 1964 through 1967, a manager of the Bond and Custody
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia allegedly disclosed
confidential Treasury Department information about upcoming issuances of government
securities to bond dealers at Blyth & Company Inc., who traded securities on the basis
of that material nonpublic information. See Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037 (Jan. 17,
1969). The SEC initiated and settled a Rule 10b-5 enforcement action against the
brokerage firm and the bond traders based on their failure to abstain from trading while
in possession of material information that they knew “was intended to be kept
non-public until a predetermined time and then disseminated pursuant to established
official procedures.” Id. at 1039–40. The SEC Release, however, did not name the
manager, but it did observe that he was suspended immediately after his tipping conduct
came to light and that he died just over a week later. Id. at 1039 n.3.
136. United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 49–51 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming
Philip Peltz’s conviction for “conspir[ing] with others, including an employee of the
SEC, to obtain confidential inside information about matters under consideration by the
Commission and use such information for private profit”). The Second Circuit observed
that Peltz had defended prostitutes in his legal practice and quotes witness testimony
revealing that Peltz sometimes “would get the company of these girls for his friends in
Washington.” Id. at 50. The SEC staffer was indicted for and convicted of perjury on
the basis of his grand jury testimony. See United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 924
(2d Cir. 1973).
137. See John B. Owens, The Clerk, the Thief, His Life as a Baker: Ashton
Embry and the Supreme Court Leak Scandal of 1919, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 271, 272
(2000). As Owens explains it, the case was dismissed even though an indictment against
the law clerk had been upheld by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and
a writ of certiorari had been denied by the Supreme Court. See id. at 295–97 (citing
Embry v. United States, 257 U.S. 655 (1921)). Owens maintains that the DOJ’s
“official files remain eerily quiet on the subject, containing no notes or memoranda
explaining why the U.S. Attorney dismissed the case.” Id. at 297.
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the source of the information.”138 And under the STOCK Act, all
federal officials owe “a duty arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence” to the U.S. Government and its citizens “with respect to
material, nonpublic information derived from such person’s
position . . . or gained from the performance of such person’s official
responsibilities.”139 Thus, in a prosecution against a federal official for
illegal tipping, Section 10(b)’s deception element would be satisfied by
proof of the official’s “undisclosed, self-serving use of [the
government’s] information”140 and Section 10(b)’s “in connection with”
element would be satisfied by proof that the federal official knew or
was reckless in not knowing that the information was to be used for
securities trading purposes.141 Section 10(b) also requires prosecutors to
prove that the information was both material and nonpublic,142 and that
the federal official acted with scienter, “a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”143 As the SEC Enforcement
Director recently assured congressional officials in his testimony on the
STOCK Act: “You have to be acting with corrupt intent, knowledge, or
recklessness. If you act in good faith, you are not going to be guilty.”144
O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory extends as well to certain
tippees who trade securities on the basis of material nonpublic
138. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (internal citation
omitted).
139. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 4(b), 9(b), 126 Stat. 291, 292,
297–98 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g) to (h) (2012)). The STOCK Act
also specifies that members of Congress and congressional employees owe a duty to
Congress itself. § 4(b).
140. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
141. Id.; see also United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“In prosecuting a putative ‘tipper’ under the misappropriation theory of insider
trading, the government must prove as an element of the offense that the tipper
conveyed material nonpublic information to his ‘tippee’ with the understanding that it
would be used for securities trading purposes.”). Nearly twenty years before Gansman,
the Second Circuit held that Rule 10b-5 liability could be established even in the
absence of proof that the defendant tippers knew their breach of fiduciary duty would
lead to securities trading. See United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 602 (2d Cir.
1993). But the intervening ruling in O’Hagan likely prompted a re-evaluation of Libera.
See Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1263 n.199 (1998) (“If
the tippers [in Libera] did not have any knowledge that the information conveyed would
be used by the tippees for securities trading purposes, it is difficult to see how the
tippers’ breach of duty (in which the tippees were co-participants) can satisfy even the
broadest interpretation of Section 10(b)’s ‘in connection with’ nexus.”).
142. See supra notes 81–82. Part II.B’s discussion of Regulation FD further
elaborates on the question of when information is material and nonpublic.
143. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
144. See House STOCK Act Hearing, supra note 22, at 32 (statement of Robert
Khuzami, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement).
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government information. As then-Second Circuit Judge Sonia
Sotomayor recognized in United States v. Falcone,145 to make a case
against a tippee defendant, the SEC or DOJ is “simply required to
prove a breach by . . . the tipper, of a duty owed to the owner of the
misappropriated information, and defendant’s knowledge that the tipper
had breached the duty.”146 These prerequisites to tippee liability were
present in the Royer case, where the short seller Elgindy was convicted
and sentenced to prison for trading on tips conveyed to him by Royer,
then an agent for the FBI.147 In essence, Royer defrauded the federal
government and its citizens through his secret, self-serving use of the
FBI’s information for personal gain and Elgindy was a co-participant in
that fraud.
2. SELF-SERVING USE OF INFORMATION BY TIPPING RATHER THAN
TRADING

O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory constitutes one of the two
theories under which insider trading violates Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. The Court’s alternative theory, the “traditional” or “classical
theory,” holds that a violation occurs when a corporate insider, such as
an officer, director, or employee “trades in the securities of his
corporation on the basis of material, non-public information.”148 As the
Court recognized in Chiarella v. United States,149 such classical insider
trading violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because “a relationship of
trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation
and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by
reason of their position with that corporation,” and this relationship
gives rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading.150 The Chiarella
decision was groundbreaking because it rejected the parity-ofinformation approach that had been developed by the SEC and lower
courts, which required “anyone in possession of material inside
information [to] either disclose it to the investing public, or . . . abstain
145. 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001).
146. Id. at 234.
147. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text.
148. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
149. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
150. Id. at 228. Three years later in Dirks, the Court observed that this
classical theory also extended to temporary agents or “constructive insiders” of the
securities issuer, such as lawyers, accountants, or consultants, who “become
fiduciaries” of the corporation’s shareholders because “they have entered into a special
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given
access to information solely for corporate purposes.” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655
n.14 (1983).
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from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such
inside information remains undisclosed.”151 In the Court’s view, this
broad parity-of-information approach flouted a fundamental precept of
common law fraud: that silence about material facts in a business
transaction amounted to fraud only in the context of a fiduciary-like
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties.152
As the Court explained in O’Hagan, the classical theory and the
misappropriation theory are complementary because “each address[es]
efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information” in connection with
securities trading, while adhering to the common law’s requirement of
a disclosure duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence.153
Whereas the “classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of
duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts, the
misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic
information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a
trading party, but to the source of the information.”154
Government insider trading cases fall squarely within the
misappropriation theory. Although federal officials are “insiders” of the
U.S. government, they are “outsiders” to the corporate issuer whose
securities are traded. But the classical theory—as reaffirmed and
expanded in Dirks v. SEC—is essential to understanding the
misappropriation theory’s application to tipping. That is, Dirks
illuminates how federal officials can be said to deceive and defraud the
federal government and its citizens by self-servingly communicating
information to others who trade securities.155
Although Dirks was quick to echo Chiarella’s view that Rule 10b-5
liability turned on the “specific relationship between the shareholders
and the individual trading on inside information,”156 Dirks extended the
duty to disclose or abstain beyond corporate insiders to certain tippees
whose liability would be “derivative from that of the insider’s duty.”157
As Justice Lewis Powell’s majority opinion explained, although a tippee
of a corporate insider typically stands as a stranger to an issuer’s
151. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
152. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (“[O]ne who fails to disclose material
information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is
under a duty to do so.”).
153. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
154. Id. at 652–53.
155. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012); SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d
1263, 1270 n.15 (11th Cir. 2003).
156. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983).
157. Id. at 659 (explaining that “tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising
from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty”
(citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12)).
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shareholders, a tippee would nonetheless assume a fiduciary-like duty
not to trade on material nonpublic information “when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the
information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that
there has been a breach.”158
Justice Powell, however, was explicit in holding that not all
disclosures of material nonpublic information would violate an insider’s
fiduciary duty. Instead, because “a purpose of the securities laws was
to eliminate ‘use of inside information for personal advantage,’”159 he
held that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability turned on the insider’s
motivation for disclosing the information.160 The requisite inquiry is
therefore a contextual one that focuses on “objective criteria, i.e.,
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from
the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that
will translate into future earnings.”161 That statement was immediately
followed by a quote from a law review article authored years before by
Professor Victor Brudney: “The theory . . . is that the insider, by
giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other
things of value for himself . . . .”162
Elaborating on the particular facts and circumstances that could
support the requisite finding of unjust enrichment (and thus disloyalty)
on the part of an insider, Justice Powell stated:
For example, there may be a relationship between the insider
and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter,
or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The
elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip
and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by
a gift of the profits to the recipient.163
Justice Powell acknowledged that such determinations of fact “will
not always be easy for courts.”164 But he concluded that this personal
benefit test was nonetheless “essential . . . to have a guiding principle
158.
159.
(1961)).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 660.
Id. at 662 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15
Id. at 662.
Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
Id. at 664 (quoting Brudney, supra note 3, at 348).
Id.
Id.
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for those whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the
SEC’s insider-trading rules.”165
As other securities law scholars have emphasized, Dirks’ guiding
principle recognizes that what Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 proscribe
“is not merely a breach of confidentiality by the insider, but rather a
breach of the duty of loyalty imposed on all fiduciaries to avoid
personally profiting from information entrusted to them.”166 Dirks’
guiding principle is likewise outcome determinative for the recipients of
material nonpublic information as well: “Absent some personal gain,
there has been no breach of duty . . . . And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach.”167
Although a few courts have questioned whether the classical
theory’s tipper-personal benefit requirement applies to cases predicated
on the misappropriation theory,168 the Eleventh Circuit drew no such
distinction in SEC v. Yun.169 After extensive analysis, Yun read
O’Hagan to require a tipper’s personal gain as a necessary element for
tipper/tippee liability in misappropriation cases.170 The Second Circuit
likewise applied the personal benefit test in SEC v. Obus,171 a recent
165.
166.

Id.

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1995); see
also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 942 (2003) (stating that under Powell’s
reasoning, “[g]arden variety breaches of the duty of care were clearly out; tipping
required a breach of the duty of loyalty”).
167. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. Despite Dirks’ clear dictate that a tippee’s
liability under Rule 10b-5 derives entirely from a tipper’s misuse of information for
personal gain, in United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007), the court
affirmed the criminal conviction of a tippee who was retried after the friend who
allegedly tipped him had been acquitted in the previous trial, id. at 325. It is
exceedingly difficult to square this result with Dirks, and the court’s effort to do so was
not convincing. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of
Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1347–48 (2009).
168. See, e.g., SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing
that the First Circuit has “left open” the question of personal benefit in
misappropriation cases, but finding that the tipper’s “gift of information” to her brother
satisfied that the Dirks test, in any event); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir.
2000) (addressing the SEC’s argument and citing pre-O’Hagan cases for the view that
there is no personal benefit requirement in misappropriation theory cases, but then
finding that the Dirks test was satisfied because the tipper likely disclosed the
information “to effect a reconciliation with his friend and to maintain a useful
networking contact”). For a comment arguing against a personal benefit requirement in
misappropriation theory cases, see David T. Cohen, Comment, Old Rule, New Theory:

Revising the Personal Benefit Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability under the
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547 (2006).
169.
170.
171.

327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).

Id. at 1279–80.
693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).
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decision stating explicitly that the tipping doctrine developed in Dirks
also “governs in a misappropriation case.”172 Indeed, since O’Hagan
was decided, no court has ever extended misappropriation theory
liability to a putative tipper in the absence of evidence that he or she
conveyed the material nonpublic information in exchange for a direct or
indirect personal benefit.
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Yun goes to the heart of the
personal benefit issue. The facts involved the wife of a corporate
executive who had been held liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
for misappropriating material nonpublic information from her husband,
who was the president of a Scholastic Corporation subsidiary.173 The
wife, however, did not trade securities herself. Rather, a jury found
that she and a co-worker/friend had defrauded her husband when she
secretly conveyed negative earnings information, with which she had
been entrusted, to the co-worker/friend, who then used that information
to trade put options on the husband’s company.174 Although the SEC
maintained that its evidence showed that the wife had personally
benefitted from her disclosure, the SEC also argued that it did not have
to prove that she “divulged the information for her own benefit; all it
had to show was that [the wife] acted with ‘severe recklessness.’”175
The Yun court emphatically rejected the SEC’s argument that “severe
recklessness,” in the absence of a showing of a personal benefit to the
tipper, is sufficient to sustain misappropriation theory liability.176
The SEC conceded that O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory rests
on an agent’s secret misuse of a principal’s information.177 But it argued
in its litigation brief that “personal benefit” to the agent (in this case,
the executive’s wife) was merely one of two alternate vehicles for
establishing the misappropriation theory’s requisite misuse.178
172. Id. at 285–86. The court vacated the summary judgment order for
defendants and ruled that the SEC had presented sufficient evidence that “if the tip
occurred,” the alleged misappropriator “made the tip intentionally and received a
personal benefit from it.” Id. at 291.
173. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1274.
174. Id. at 1267–70.
175. Id. at 1274. The Yun court observed that the SEC’s argument on appeal
was “contrary to the position it assumed in its complaint,” which had plainly alleged
that the wife had “deliberately communicated the confidential information [to her
friend] ‘for her direct and/or indirect personal benefit because of her business
relationship and friendship with’” him. Id. (quoting Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial Injunctive Relief Sought, SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (No.
699CV00117), 1999 WL 34965842 at ¶ 21).
176. Id. at 1282.
177. See Brief of Securities and Exchange Commission, Appellee, SEC v.
Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-14490), 2001 WL 34455703, at *42–43.
178. Id. at *45.
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According to the SEC, the other way by which an agent could breach
her duty not to misuse information “is by making an unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information in a way that is likely to harm the
principal.”179 The SEC drew support from section 395 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, which was cited by the Court in
O’Hagan.180 The SEC thus sought to convince the court that regardless
of whether the wife personally gained from her disclosure of the
entrusted information, the wife had recklessly harmed her husband’s
reputation and career, thereby warranting both tipper and tippee
liability.181
The SEC’s “harm to the principal” argument, however,
overlooked several key statements in O’Hagan, all of which make clear
that the misappropriation theory always requires undisclosed personal
gain on the part of the fiduciary-like person who is alleged to be a
misappropriating tipper. The Court, for instance, framed the
misappropriation theory as “a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use
of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, [which] . . .
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”182 Later
in the opinion, the Court emphasized that “misappropriators . . . deal in
deception. A fiduciary who ‘[pretends] loyalty to the principal while
secretly converting the principal’s information for personal gain’
‘dupes’ or defrauds the principal.”183 And elsewhere, the Court
observed that the “misappropriation theory bars only ‘trading on the
basis of information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in
violation of some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation to the
owner or rightful possessor of the information.’”184
The O’Hagan Court’s repeated use of the term “conversion” is
telling, as is the term “misappropriation” itself. An agent who
recklessly disregards a likely harm to her principal may well be a
wrongdoer under the law of agency because unauthorized
communications of a principal’s secrets typically breach an agent’s
179. Id.
180. Id. at *42–43 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654–55
(1997)). The comments to section 395 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides
that a fiduciary “has a duty not to use the information acquired by [the fiduciary] as
agent . . . for any purpose likely to cause [the] principal harm or to interfere with [the
principal’s] business.” Id. at *42–43 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 395 cmt. a (1958)).
181. Id. at *45–46 (“David Yun was likely to suffer harm in his position as a
senior corporate executive by his role in a chain of events that led to confidential
corporate information entrusted to him being disclosed (by Donna Yun) to a person
(Burch) who used that information to trade the company’s securities.”).
182. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 653–54 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
184. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
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duties of confidentiality and care.185 But unless motivated by personal
gain, an agent’s disclosure to a third party would not breach her duties
of trust and confidence. And without this secret breach of loyalty, the
agent who disclosed that information would not be “feigning fidelity”
to the information’s source.186 It is thus the disclosing agent’s unjust
enrichment from the use of material nonpublic information that
transforms a mere breach of care and confidentiality into a deceptive
misappropriation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
The court in Yun flatly rejected the SEC’s “harm to the principal”
argument because it recognized that undisclosed personal gain from the
misuse of material nonpublic information constitutes the crux of
O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory. As the Eleventh Circuit
emphasized, “O’Hagan explicitly states or implicitly assumes that a
misappropriator must gain personally from his trading on the
confidential information.”187 The Yun court continued:
If we were to hold that a misappropriator who tips—rather
than trades—is liable even though he intends no personal
benefit from his tip, then we would impose liability more
readily for tipping than trading. Such a result would be
absurd, and would undermine the Supreme Court’s rationale
for imposing the benefit requirement in the first place: the
desire to ensure that a tip rises to the level of a trade. . . . The
better approach, in our view, is to follow Dirks and ensure
that an outsider who tips must have done so with the intent of
benefitting from the tippee’s trading.188
The Yun court also reasoned that Dirks would be a “dead letter” if
the SEC could avoid establishing the personal benefit element simply by
proceeding under the misappropriation theory instead of the classical
theory.189 That is, Yun recognized what securities law scholars have
long pointed out: “Virtually all cases that could be brought [under the
classical theory] can also be styled as misappropriation cases.”190
185. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2005) (“[A]n agent
has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally
exercised by agents in similar circumstances.”).
186. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
187. SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT
& PREVENTION § 6-2 (West vol. 18, 2012); see also WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I.
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 492 (3rd ed. 2010) (“[I]n most instances, both the
Commission and private plaintiffs could recast a classical special relationship cases as
involving ‘misappropriation.’”).
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In its final analysis, Yun concluded that the SEC’s evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the wife had expected to
benefit from her tip to the codefendant “by maintaining a good
relationship between a friend and frequent partner in real estate
deals.”191 Thus, the agency emerged victorious notwithstanding the
Eleventh Circuit’s clear dictate “that the SEC must prove that a
misappropriator expected to benefit from the tip.”192
3. PROVING IMPROPER PERSONAL GAIN FROM SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE
Although misappropriation theory cases applying Dirks’ personal
benefit test are replete with instances of tips deemed illegal,193 courts
have yet to grapple with the test in the specific context of securities
trading on the basis of material nonpublic government information. To
be sure, in the few cases that have been brought against government
insiders for illegal tipping, the defendants each appeared to have
benefitted personally from his tip to the trading outsiders.194 But these
personal benefits all took the form of explicit quid pro quos (meaning
“to take this for a that”). For example, the leaker in Royer, an FBI
agent, was promised a share of the trading profits generated from the
use of that information as well as lucrative future employment,195 and
the leaker in Peltz, a branch chief at the SEC, was enticed with the
hiring of a prostitute.196 In both cases, the federal official’s exploitation
of the government’s information breached the duty of loyalty at the
center of Dirks and O’Hagan, and the failure to disclose that breach (by
“feigning fidelity”) defrauded the agency and the federal government.
Dirks also establishes that a federal official’s “gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend” would constitute an indirect
personal benefit that would likewise trigger a Rule 10b-5 disclosure
obligation.197 Thus, the government insiders in 1789 who shared
information with outsiders about Hamilton’s bond redemption plan
likely engaged in illegal tipping under the federal securities law that
Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280.
Id. at 1275.
In addition to Yun, see SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006), and
SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000). See also United States v. Rajaratnam,
191.
192.
193.

802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that a reasonable jury could infer
from a wiretapped call that the tipper and the tippee had a quid pro quo arrangement
that satisfied the test for a personal benefit).
194. See, e.g., Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); United States v. Royer,
549 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008); supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
197. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
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exists today: the fact that many of the tippers also purchased bonds for
themselves provides compelling evidence that they sought to “gift” the
information to their Federalist friends. Absent such obvious gifts or
explicit quid pro quos, how should Dirks apply to a federal official who
conveys material nonpublic information to a government outsider who
then trades?
In the wake of the STOCK Act, several commentators have
suggested that prosecutors and courts are likely to construe Dirks’
personal benefit test expansively in the context of tips involving
government information. Professor Stephen Bainbridge, for instance,
speculated that “[n]ow that Congress is covered by the insider-trading
law, if a member of Congress gives a tip to a hedge fund manager, that
is going to be illegal,”198 provided that the SEC or DOJ can show “that
the Member got a personal benefit from making the tip, such as a
political contribution, log-rolling support for legislation, or enhanced
reputation.”199 John Berlau, a senior fellow at the Competitive
Enterprise Institute, expressed the fear that congressional staffers could
be prosecuted simply for facilitating the legislative agenda of the
senator or representative who employs them:
Presumably, if a congressional staffer helps his or her boss
win a major legislative battle, that staffer’s reputation would
rise—and, quite possibly, so would his or her future earnings.
Thus, if a congressional staffer discloses, say, a nonpublic
draft bill to a think-tanker or activist for the purpose of aiding
the recipient’s efforts to support or defeat the legislation, it is
certainly plausible that a court might find that the disclosure
was for personal benefit. 200
Others have zeroed in on politicians and their continual need to
raise campaign funds, with one attorney bemoaning that “[w]here the
recipient of the information is a past or future campaign contributor, a
fact finder might be asked to infer the requisite intent to benefit

Mullins & Ackerman, supra note 28.
Stephen Bainbridge, Quoted re STOCK Act’s Impact on Political
Intelligence, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:18 AM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/02/quoted-re-stockacts-impact-on-political-intelligence.html.
200. John Berlau, The STOCK Act and the SEC, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb.
21, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/291570/stock-act-andsec-john-berlau?pg=2.
198.
199.
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established by that fact alone, even without any direct evidence of a
quid pro quo.”201 He therefore warns that:
Given the very wide net potentially cast by insider trading
law, one can expect prosecutors and the Securities and
Exchange Commission to take the position that under the
STOCK Act, if a member or staff person discloses to a
member of the public material nonpublic information obtained
during the course of the member or staff’s congressional
duties, and the constituent trades on the information, both the
member and the constituent have committed insider trading.202
Another attorney, referencing the difficulties that inhere in making
determinations of materiality, went so far as to advise securities traders
“to treat all non-public information learned from a member of Congress
or their staff as material confidential information subject to the
restrictions of the [STOCK Act].”203
We highly doubt, for several reasons, that securities law enforcers
and courts will construe Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in a manner that
validates these predictions and cautionary warnings. Instead, we would
expect to see SEC and DOJ prosecutions of federal officials (or
securities traders who use government information) only in those rare
instances involving either gifts of information to relatives or personal
friends, or explicit quid pro quos involving identifiable personal
benefits beyond enhanced reputations and the mere possibility of future
political support or campaign contributions. We draw our analysis from
three distinct areas: the SEC’s experience with selective disclosure in
the private sector, the constitutional limitations that courts have placed
on other statutes that implicate political speech and other interactions
between government officials and members of the public, and the
STOCK Act’s “Rule of Construction” provision.

a. An object lesson from the private sector
Although a full exploration of selective disclosure in the private
sector is set forth in Part II, its object lesson can be encapsulated here.
201. Peter G. Neiman, Is the STOCK Act Constitutional?, N.Y. L.J.
(Mar.
27,
2012),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202546944492&Is_the_STOCK_Act_Unconstitutional&slreturn
=20121016175848 (available at LexisNexis).
202. Id.
203. Joshua Horn, The STOCK Act Presents Pitfalls for the Private Sector,
REUTERS
NEWS
&
INSIGHT
(May
17,
2012),
THOMSON
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/Insight/2012/05_-_May/
The_STOCK_Act_presents_pitfalls_for_the_private_sector/.
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Until Regulation FD took effect in 2000, securities issuers and their
corporate executives routinely put ordinary investors at a disadvantage
by leaking material nonpublic information about corporate earnings and
other developments to securities analysts who shared the information
with professional investors who then traded. The SEC’s struggle to end
selective disclosure in the private sector demonstrates that
communications, which arguably serve legitimate purposes, will
effectively escape regulation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. As
Part II elucidates, Dirks created an antifraud safe harbor that insulates
most communications between corporate executives and securities
analysts because its personal benefit test implicates only those
disclosures that evidenced a breach of an insider’s duty of loyalty. And
corporate officials who have business-related reasons for sharing
material nonpublic information with securities analysts are not acting
disloyally (i.e., in breach of their duty of trust and confidence), even if
their own professional reputations are enhanced along the way.
Dirks’ safe harbor for selective disclosure in the public sector
likely runs even wider and deeper than it does in the corporate world
because goodwill, professional reputation, and fundraising are integral
parts of American politics. The member of Congress, the legislative
aide, the Cabinet official, or the agency staff member who briefs
interested parties on the status of pending legislation or regulation is
making the operations of government more transparent (albeit
selectively and thus, oftentimes, unfairly vis-à-vis the rest of the
public).204 Additionally, through the solicitation of feedback, the federal
official may be making the government more effective.205 It is hardly
surprising that goodwill, enhanced professional reputation, or future
political support or campaign contributions typically result from those
interchanges. But the relevant question under Dirks and O’Hagan is
whether these results constitute improper personal benefits: do they
evidence a breach of the federal official’s duty of loyalty through his or
her misuse of the government’s information?206 In the context of a
political system that turns on electoral campaigns financed largely
through individual and corporate donations, these typical upshots of
meetings and briefings are not likely to be construed as “exploitation of
nonpublic information” for personal gain absent clear evidence of an

204. See infra Part III.A.
205. See supra note 121.
206. See infra note 283 and accompanying text (pointing to Justice Harry
Blackmun’s observation in Dirks that an enhanced reputation in the abstract was not
sufficient to satisfy the majority’s own test for fraudulent tipping).
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explicit quid pro quo.207 Thus, as they do with communications between
corporate executives and securities analysts, Dirks and O’Hagan set a
standard that renders most selective disclosures of nonpublic
government information—and most securities trading based on such
disclosures—beyond the reach of the prohibitions in Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.

b. Constitutional considerations
Even if courts and securities law enforcers were otherwise inclined
to view enhanced reputation and the possibility of future political
support or campaign contributions as improper personal benefits within
the meaning of Dirks and O’Hagan, constitutional considerations
would, in many instances, preclude them from doing so. Indeed, the
for
Constitution
requires
substantial
“breathing
space”208
communications between federal officials and members of the public
because “speech on public issues occupies ‘the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special
protection.”209 This special protection for political speech takes the
form of strict scrutiny and is warranted because “speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment.”210 Thus, in drawing the line between fraudulent tipping
and unfair selective disclosure, “the First Amendment requires [courts]
to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing
it.”211
Interactions between federal officials and the media are yet another
area in which First Amendment protections are likely to apply. The
right to freedom of the press would make it exceedingly difficult for the
SEC or DOJ to prosecute journalists for republishing nonpublic
market-moving government information212 and this protection would
likely extend to financial newsletters, including those having a narrow
subscription base principally of hedge funds and other professional
investors.213 It is also highly unlikely that the SEC or DOJ would
207. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
208. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
209. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
210. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
211. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007). See generally
Neiman, supra note 201.
212. See generally infra note 411 and accompanying text.
213. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation and the
First Amendment, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 93, 95–96.
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pursue legal actions against federal officials for selective disclosure in
circumstances where related actions against the media organizations or
their subscribers for trading on the information would be
unsuccessful.214
In addition to the heightened constitutional scrutiny that is
accorded to political speech and a free press, several other
constitutional protections militate in favor of a narrow construction of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the selective disclosure of
government information is at issue. The First Amendment likewise
protects “the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances”215 and, as constitutional scholars have observed,
the Petitions Clause has been treated as a right “to participate fully in
the political process, free from threats or reprisals.”216 Communications
with members of Congress or their staffs and members of the public
may also draw special protection from the Speech or Debate Clause,217
which extends not only to actual speech or debate by members of
Congress, but also to those actions (including actions by staffers)
“related to the due functioning of the legislative process.”218 In
addition, our representative democracy, which is reflected in the
Constitution’s very structure, may warrant a narrow interpretation of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that avoids undue interference with
interactions between federal officials and citizen-investors.
Although the Constitution’s interplay with Dirks and O’Hagan has
yet to be explored in a government tipping case, personal benefit
questions arise frequently in other political corruption cases and courts
have taken great care to avoid construing federal statutes, such as those

214. However, as illustrated by the recent phone-hacking scandal in the United
Kingdom involving the Murdoch press organization, there are limits to what the press
can do to obtain government information: even the press cannot pay bribes to
governmental officials in return for information. See Amy Chozick, A Scandal Starts to
Hem in Murdoch’s Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2012, at A1.
215. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
216. James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward
a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims against the Government, 91 NW. U.
L. REV. 899, 904 (1997).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either
House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”).
218. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966); see also United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) (“A legislative act has consistently been
defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business before it.”);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972) (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause
applies not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the latter
would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.”).
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that prohibit bribery,219 illegal gratuities,220 or extortion221 in a manner
that criminalizes ordinary politics.222 Individuals and corporations, for
example, have a First Amendment right to contribute to political
campaigns and causes, and politicians have an ancillary right to solicit
such contributions.223 The Supreme Court has therefore concluded that
a connection between a campaign contribution and an official action can
evidence a crime “only if the payments are made in return for an
explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to
perform an official act.”224 If federal statutes specifically designed to
curtail political corruption cannot be construed in a way that
unconstitutionally restricts or excessively chills the rights to free
speech, expression, and political participation, surely the same is true
for the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.

c. The STOCK Act’s rule of construction
The STOCK Act itself contains interpretative guidance when the
communication of material nonpublic government information is at
issue. Captioned a “Rule of Construction,” Section 10(2) provides that
nothing in the Act shall be construed to “be in derogation of the
obligations, duties, and functions of a Member of Congress, an
219. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(a) (2006) (making it a crime for both the offeror
and the public official to corruptly engage in a transfer of anything of value with the
intent to influence any official act).
220. § 201(c) (making it a crime to provide (or accept) a gratuity “for or
because of” the official’s performance of an official act “otherwise than as provided by
law for the proper discharge of official duty”).
221. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)-(b) (2006) (making it a crime to obtain
property with the consent of the victim “under color of official right”).
222. See PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION 37–47, 107–121 (2011). Despite the care taken, many have
urged the Supreme Court to better clarify what constitutes quid pro quo corruption.
See, e.g., Brief of Richard F. Scruggs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Siegelman v. United States, No. 11-955 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 707060 at
*17–19. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, When Is a Campaign Contribution a
Bribe?, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 127 (William C. Heffernan & John
Kleining eds., 2004).
223. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (“Making a
contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.
In addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of
common political goals.”).
224. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991) (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ccepting
a campaign contribution does not equal taking a bribe unless the payment is made in
exchange for an explicit promise to perform or not perform an official act. Vague
expectations of some future benefit should not be sufficient to make a payment a
bribe.”).

1328

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

employee of Congress, an executive branch employee, a judicial
officer, or a judicial employee, arising from such person’s official
position.”225 A construction of the Act’s “duty of trust and confidence”
that renders enhanced reputation and the mere possibility of future
political support or campaign contributions as improper personal
benefits within the meaning of Dirks and O’Hagan could well impede
federal officials from functioning effectively. Government functions
could be impeded because federal officials would operate under the
cloud of a possible fraud prosecution whenever they reveal nonpublic
information in meetings or briefings with members of the public who
could trade securities. As Part III explains, federal officials have a host
of legitimate reasons for selectively sharing nonpublic information with
broad ranges of individuals and entities.226
The legislative history concerning Section 10 of the STOCK Act is
sparse. The little that exists consists primarily of a colloquy between
Senators Harry Reid and Joseph Lieberman that occurred immediately
before the Senate’s final vote on the Act.227 Senator Reid began the
exchange with the observation that “the STOCK Act should not be
interpreted as limiting government transparency in any way. Discourse
with the public, whether privately or publicly, is vital to maintaining a
healthy democratic society.”228 Senator Lieberman concurred,
emphasizing his “agree[ment] that the STOCK Act is not intended
to . . . hinder dissemination of information to interested parties
regarding Congressional activities and deliberations.”229 Both senators
then sought to ameliorate concerns about “significant chilling effect[s]”
by referencing conversations with the SEC that “explicitly clarified that
it does not view the STOCK Act as creating new limitations on the
disclosure of Congressional information in conversations with
constituents.”230
The STOCK Act’s Rule of Construction, read in light of this
legislative history, reflects an intention by Congress to insulate from
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability at least some communications
that federal officials can be expected to make in the course of their
official duties. It therefore obliges courts, as well as the SEC and the
225. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 10(2), 126 Stat. 291, 298 (2012) (to
be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
226. See infra Part III.A.
227. See Robert L. Walker, The STOCK Act: Insider Trading on Government
Information; Corporate and Individual Compliance Concerns, WILEY REIN LLP (Apr.
4, 2012), www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&id=7953.
228. 158 CONG. REC. S1980 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Harry Reid).
229. Id. (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman).
230. Id. (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
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DOJ, to proceed with extraordinary care in distinguishing between
fraudulent tipping and lawful, though frequently unfair, selective
disclosure.

C. Legislative Proposals beyond the STOCK Act
The STOCK Act includes an important provision requiring the
Comptroller General, who heads the GAO, to perform a study and
report to Congress within one year “on the role of political intelligence
in the financial markets.”231 The report must discuss, among other
matters, the extent to which securities investors are buying and relying
on political intelligence, and the “legal and practical issues that may be
raised by the imposition of disclosure requirements on those who
engage in political intelligence activities.”232 The Act defines “political
intelligence” as:
information that is—(1) derived by a person from direct
communications with an executive branch employee, a
Member of Congress, or an employee of Congress; and (2)
provided in exchange for financial compensation to a client
who intends, and who is known to intend, to use the
information to inform investment decisions.233
This mandate for a GAO study replaced two related proposals for
legislative action in earlier iterations of the STOCK Act, including the
original version, which was introduced in the House in 2006 by United
States Representatives Brian Baird (D-Wash.) and Louise M. Slaughter
(D-N.Y.).234 One proposal would have applied the Lobbying Disclosure
Act (LDA)235 to political intelligence consultants, requiring them to
register and make public disclosures about their political intelligence
activities.236 The other proposal would have amended the federal
securities laws to include a broad ban on securities trading on the basis
of material nonpublic government information.237 Although both
proposals are well-intentioned attempts to go beyond the STOCK Act to
curtail securities trading on selectively disclosed government
231. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 7(a)(1), 126 Stat. 291, 294 (2012).
The Act requires the Comptroller General to work in consultation with the
Congressional Research Service. Id.
232. § 7(a)(2)(F).
233. § 7(b).
234. STOCK Act, H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2006).
235. Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
236. H.R. 5015 § 4.
237. H.R. 5015 § 2(a).
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information, each places the burden entirely on the private sector and
neither tackles the problem at its root, which is the federal
government’s own lack of effective internal controls regarding its
dissemination of material nonpublic information.
1. REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE CONSULTANTS

Both the original Baird-Slaughter STOCK Act bill and the version
of the bill that passed the Senate on February 2, 2012, contained a
provision that would have regulated political intelligence gathering in a
manner similar to lobbying activity.238 Specifically, the political
intelligence provision in the Senate’s bill of February 2, 2012 (which
passed as an amendment sponsored by Senator Grassley239), would have
amended the LDA to require registration of “political intelligence
firm[s]” and public reporting of “political intelligence activities.”240
Political intelligence activities included “political intelligence contacts”
as well as “efforts in support of such contacts.”241 And the term
“political intelligence contact” was broadly defined to include “any oral
or written communication . . . to or from a covered executive branch
official or a covered legislative branch official” that results in
information “intended for use in analyzing securities or commodities
markets, or in informing investment decisions, and which is made on
behalf of a client” regarding: (1) “the formulation, modification, or
adoption” of any federal legislation “including legislative proposals;”
(2) any “Federal rule, regulation . . . policy, or position of the United
238. H.R. 5015; 158 CONG. REC. S310–15 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012).
Representatives Baird and Slaughter reintroduced a similar bill in 2009. H.R. 682,
111th Cong. (2009). In 2011, the bill was again reintroduced with Representative Tim
Walz (D-Minn.) joining Slaughter as its principal cosponsor after Representative
Baird’s retirement from office. H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Nagy, supra
note 25, at 1130–31 (recounting the STOCK Act’s origins). The STOCK Act bill that
passed the Senate on February 2, 2012, was brought to the floor by the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, led by Chairman Joseph Lieberman (IConn.) and ranking member Susan Collins (R-Me.). 158 CONG. REC. S310 (daily ed.
Feb. 2, 2012). Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) and Scott Brown (R-Mass.) were
the lead Senate co-sponsors. Id. at S291.
239. 158 CONG. REC. S296–97 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Charles Grassley).
240. Id. at S313. The term “political intelligence firm” is defined to mean “a
person or entity that has 1 or more employees who are political intelligence consultants
to a client other than that person or entity” and the term “political intelligence
consultant” is defined to mean “any individual who is employed or retained by a client
for financial or other compensation for services that include one or more political
intelligence contacts.’’ Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id.
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States Government;” or (3) “the administration or execution of a
Federal program or policy,” including contracts, grants, loans, and
licenses.242 Communications made by or to media representatives,
however, would not be deemed a political intelligence contact, “if the
purpose of the communication is gathering and disseminating news and
information to the public.”243
The Senate’s proposed political intelligence provision was then
dropped from the STOCK Act bill that passed the House by a vote of
417-2 on February 9, 2012.244 Although many members in both
chambers had urged the creation of a joint conference committee to
reconcile the differences between the House and Senate versions,245
Senate leadership instead chose to vote on the bill that the House had
passed without any further amendments.246 This House version—with
the GAO study, but without the section regulating political
intelligence—passed the Senate 96-3 on March 22, 2012,247 and the bill
became law on April 4, 2012.248
Notwithstanding Congress’s decision in the STOCK Act to study
political intelligence before attempting to regulate it, legislative efforts
to require registration and reporting have continued. In the House,
Congresswoman Slaughter, together with her colleagues Tim Walz
(D-Minn.) and Mike Quigley (D-Ill.), are cosponsoring the Restore
Public Trust Act, which includes a section that would apply the LDA to
political intelligence firms;249 in the Senate, Charles Grassley and
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) are expected to introduce their own bill.250
Describing the GAO study as a way to “kick[] the can down the road
for another year,”251 Senator Grassley is urging speedy action for a
“straightforward” reason: “if trades are taking place based on ‘political
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. Id.
244. 158 CONG. REC. H645–48, H657 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2012); see also
Rachel Bade, Two Senators Blast Cantor over Dropped Provisions in Insider-Trading
Bill, CQ TODAY, Feb. 8, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 308486.
245. See Richard E. Cohen, Lawmakers Push for Conference Committee on
Insider-Trading Measure, CQ TODAY, Feb. 16, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR
3767180.
246. See Pear, supra note 23.
247. 158 CONG. REC. S1981 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012).
248. Remarks on Signing the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of
2012, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 247 (Apr. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200247/pdf/DCPD-201200247.pdf.
249. H.R. 4054, 112th Cong. § 101 (2012).
250. See Bridgette Blair, STOCK Act Becomes Law, PUBLIC CITIZEN NEWS,
May/June 2012, at 1, 16.
251. 158 CONG. REC. S1966 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Charles Grassley).
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intelligence’ . . . obtained from Congress or the executive branch,
people in this country should know who is gathering such
information.”252
At first blush, requiring public reporting of certain political
intelligence activities seems sensible, because the information in those
reports would put federal officials, the media, and the general public on
notice as to the persons and entities seeking to profit from selective
disclosure. But, as with most legislation, the devil is in the details and
the details contained in the new Slaughter-Walz-Quigley bill—which
mirrors the political intelligence section that was omitted from the
STOCK Act—raise a host of concerns.
One concern involves the scope of the phrase “political intelligence
contacts.”253 The definition is considerably overinclusive, extending
well beyond the firms and persons performing the type of
behind-closed-doors gathering and/or brokering of inside connections
that has been profiled in the media.254 The proposed legislation’s
sweeping registration requirement, coupled with its cumbersome
reporting obligations, will likely burden a wide range of persons who
are principally interested in gathering information as to what their
government is doing. While these people may be engaged in securities
or commodities trading, they may also be engaged in affecting change
for the public interest.
Consider a private foundation, a university, a church, or some
other organization that is interested in learning about how government
activities will affect commercial or societal interests that are vital to the
organization. Assume the organization also invests in the securities
markets. If the organization hires a person to gather information about
prospective government policies, does that person have to register and
report? The proposed definition of “political intelligence activities”
focuses on information gathered for the purpose of investment decisions
and the person gathering the information may have been hired
principally to help the organization form a strategy for responding to
government actions. But the gatherer also may have no idea how the
information will actually, or ultimately, be used. Accordingly, to be on
the safe side, the gatherer may feel compelled to register as a political
intelligence consultant simply because his or her client trades in
securities markets. Then, whenever the registered consultant has a
“political intelligence contact,” he or she will have to report both the
nature of the contact and the client who is benefitting from that contact.
252.
Grassley).
253.
254.

158 CONG. REC. S487 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2012) (statement of Sen. Charles

See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.2–3.
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Moreover, the proposed definition of a “political intelligence
consultant”—which extends to a person who simply makes a single
contact requesting information from a federal official255—is far more
expansive than the LDA’s definition of “lobbyist,” which excludes any
“individual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of
the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to [a]
client over a 3-month period.”256
Another concern involves the linkage of “political intelligence
contacts” to any information informing an “investment decision,” even
if that decision is not in any way related to securities trading. Consider
a manufacturing corporation that hires a consultant to meet with senior
officials at the EPA to garner insights about environmental compliance.
Assume the corporation receives some guidance and then makes a
capital investment decision based on what the consultant reports. Or
consider a businessperson who retains someone to meet with her
congressman to inquire about whether military base X is likely to be
closed. Assume that the businessperson learns that the base is likely to
remain open and then she uses that information to decide whether to
invest in a new store in location A near base X. These are surely
investment decisions, but posing those questions to a member of
Congress and making investment decisions based on that information
hardly undermines investor confidence in the securities markets or in
government. Yet, the information gatherers may well be obliged to
register and report under the Slaughter-Walz-Quigley bill as currently
written.
On the other hand, people truly in the political intelligence
business will have an incentive to avoid registration and reporting under
the LDA and they will be eager to capitalize on statutory loopholes.
The proposed blanket exemption for the media257 is one potential
avenue of abuse because many news outlets serve a narrow subscription
base of securities investors or give high-paying subscribers early notice
of news developments.258 Differentiating among news organizations—
and requiring some to register and allowing others to use the
exemption—is not something any government official should be
expected to do without bias and trepidation. News organizations often
have an enormous influence over whether government officials get to
keep their jobs.
It is possible, of course, that with the benefit of insight and
guidance from the GAO study, these and other drafting issues can be
255.
256.
257.
258.

See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1602(10) (2006).
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.6.
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resolved in a manner that would focus more precisely on regulating the
professional political intelligence consultants who comprise the industry
generating more than a $100 million annually.259 But no amount of
targeted sunshine on the political intelligence industry will be an
adequate substitute for better internal controls on the federal
government’s own dissemination of material nonpublic information.
2. AN OUTRIGHT BAN ON SECURITIES TRADING BASED ON MATERIAL
NONPUBLIC GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

In addition to a section regulating political intelligence, prior
versions of the STOCK Act also included a section that would have
effectively banned any hedge fund, professional investor, or individual
investor from trading securities on the basis of material nonpublic
government information. For instance, the Slaughter-Walz bill,260 which
garnered a remarkable 285 cosponsors in the House in the aftermath of
the 60 Minutes segment,261 would have required the SEC to promulgate
new rules under Section 10 of the Exchange Act prohibiting “any
person from buying or selling the securities or security-based swaps of
any issuer while such person is in possession of material nonpublic
information” derived from Federal employment and relating to such
information, if such person knew “that the information was so
obtained” from a federal officer or employee.262 Thus, under the broad
statutory language in this proposed provision, liability for insider
trading would not have turned on a showing that a federal officer or
employee had breached a duty of trust and confidence in selectively
disclosing the information to the person who traded. Instead, the
proposed ban on securities trading would have extended even to

259. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
260. H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011).
261. See supra note 21; H.R. 1148 – STOCK bill (“STOCK Act”),
OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h1148/show (last visited Nov.
10, 2012).
262. H.R. 1148 § 2(b). The bill proposed amending the Exchange Act with a
new Section 10(d), captioned “Nonpublic Information Relating to Congress,” and a
new Section 10(e), captioned “Nonpublic Information Relating to Other Federal
Employees.” Id. However, as proposed, Section 10(d)’s application to Congress would
have extended the trading prohibition only to material nonpublic information “relating
to any pending or prospective legislation action relating to such issuer.” Id.; see also
Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 306 (pointing out that much market-moving congressional
knowledge does not in any way pertain to legislative action); Nagy, supra note 25, at
1133–34.
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material nonpublic government information that been disclosed to a
recipient in good faith for an entirely legitimate reason.263
An outright ban on securities trading while a person is aware of
material nonpublic information obtained from federal officials would
have been a radical departure from existing federal securities law, to
say the least. Had Congress adopted this ban, it would have essentially
reinstated, for government information, the parity-of-information
approach to securities fraud liability that the Court had rejected
emphatically in Chiarella.264 The federal law governing insider trading
in securities is confusing enough without dual tracks setting forth
different prohibitions based on the identity of the source of the
information.265
Beyond that, an outright ban on securities trading while a person is
aware of material nonpublic information obtained from federal
officials—which would be enforceable through SEC or DOJ actions—
would undoubtedly discourage many citizens from using lawful means
to gather political information. Many people could fear that federal
officials would respond to their efforts by encouraging an SEC or DOJ
investigation into their investment activities. The result would likely be
a government that is far less transparent to its constituents and
securities markets that are substantially less efficient.266 Our proposed
263. Just like in Rule 14e-3 insider trading cases involving tender offer-related
information, the proposed ban could have extended even to material nonpublic
government information that had been overheard in a Capitol Hill restaurant, provided
that the lucky listener knew that his source was a federal officer or employee. Cf.
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“Rule 14e-3 is
a disclosure provision. It creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to
abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary
duty to respect the confidentiality of the information.”). The SEC Exchange Act
Section 14(e)’s authority to regulate securities trading in the context of tender offers,
however, is considerably broader than its authority to regulate fraudulent securities
trading under Section 10(b). See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997).
264. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
265. For critical assessments of existing jurisprudence, see, for example, Jill E.
Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation,
26 GA. L. REV. 179, 179 (1991) (“[T]he legal restrictions on trading securities while in
possession of material nonpublic information are confused and confusing.”); Thomas
Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic
Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 883 (2010) (observing that there are “hundreds of
decisions grappling” with insider trading’s fraud-based rubric and that “[m]any of these
decisions are confusing and inconsistent with one another”); and Saikrishna Prakash,
Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1498 (1999)
(“[T]he SEC’s dysfunctional regulatory strategy brings to mind unpleasant images of
Cinderella’s stepsisters who each chopped off portions of a foot in order to stuff the
foot into Cinderella’s shoe.”).
266. See infra notes 284–286 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
concern in Dirks that an overly broad insider trading prohibition would deter analysts
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FGD regime—which attends to the way in which government insiders
disclose information, rather than what the way in which outsiders
gather and use that information—provides a superior alternative.
II. SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Our law has no tolerance for favoritism. It holds no place for
privilege. Everyone deserves a fair shot at success in our
nation’s securities markets. Well-connected people don’t
deserve any greater chance for success than the average
citizen. Nor do the friends and relatives of those well-placed
people, who may reap unfair profits because they happen to
know the news before it breaks. The process of capital
formation is not an insider’s game run for a select group of
those “in the know.” It’s an expression of our democracy’s
faith in fundamental fairness. It’s simply a question of
integrity.
—SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt267

SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt’s remarks could well have been
directed at federal officials who facilitate securities trading on the basis
of selectively disclosed government information. But when he was
admonishing favoritism and privilege in February 1998, his appeal to
integrity was targeted at corporate officials in the private sector and
their lawyers. Securities analysts and professional investors had been
reaping enormous profits from trading on the basis of nonpublic
corporate information pertaining to earnings and other developments,
which CEOs and other executives had been sharing routinely in
advance of public announcements. The SEC considered such selective
disclosure to be an unfair practice that undermined investor confidence
in the securities markets. But it was struggling to prevent it because
these executives were rarely misusing the issuer’s information in
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Regulation FD created new disclosure obligations on the part of
publicly traded companies and thereby eliminated special trading
from gathering corporate information, which is an activity essential to the preservation
of efficient securities markets); Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the
Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1990) (observing that Dirks, and
much of the academic commentary that followed sought legal rules that would
encourage searches for useful and accurate information, which would in turn be
“reflected in the prevailing market price of the issuer’s securities, to society’s benefit”).
267. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, A Question of Integrity: Promoting
Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading, SEC Speaks Conference (Feb. 27,
1998).
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privileges for securities analysts and their clients. The result is that
today, more than a decade later, investors operate on a playing field
that is no longer as tilted toward those with special access to corporate
executives. But this positive development did not result from the
application of laws proscribing insider trading. Instead, securities
markets became fairer only when the SEC turned its focus to regulating
issuers and the means and manner by which they disclose material
nonpublic information. Given the federal government’s own problems
with unfair selective disclosure, the private sector’s experience is
enormously instructive.

A. Corporate Executives and Securities Analysts
1. THE SAFE HARBOR IN DIRKS
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks v. SEC, securities
analysts enjoyed no particular privilege vis-à-vis the insider trading
prohibitions arising under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Throughout
the 1970s, lower courts and the SEC embraced the so-called
parity-of-information approach to insider trading,268 and this broad
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 liability essentially prohibited analysts and
their clients from trading securities based on material nonpublic
information that had been selectively disclosed by corporate officials.
Even in this pre-classical theory period, courts had recognized that
analysts performed “a needed service in culling and sifting available
data, viewing it in light of their own knowledge of a particular industry
and ultimately furnishing a distilled product in the form of reports.”269
But those valuable contributions to market efficiency were not viewed
as a reason for relaxing the parity-of-information rule. Thus, corporate
executives who shared material nonpublic information with securities
analysts incurred liability for illegal tipping and the securities analysts
or clients who traded on the basis of selectively disclosed information
incurred liability for illegal trading.270 As famously characterized by the
268. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (quoting the Second Circuit’s
holding in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)).
269. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff’d, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
270. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167–68 (2d
Cir. 1980) (Chief Financial Officer violated Rule 10b-5 when he responded to an
analyst’s question with the material nonpublic information that earnings would be
down); Bausch, 565 F.2d at 18–19 (corporate executive violated Rule 10b-5 by sharing
material nonpublic information with analyst, but holding that the SEC’s request for an
injunction was not warranted); SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 42–43 (2d
Cir. 1976) (CEO violated Rule 10b-5 by disclosing merger-related information in
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Second Circuit in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc,271 discussions were
akin to “a fencing match conducted on a tightrope” where corporate
executives were “compelled to parry often incisive questioning [by
securities analysts] while teetering on the fine line between data
properly conveyed and material inside information that may not be
revealed without simultaneously disclosing it to the public.”272
When the Court decided Dirks in 1983, however, insider trading
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was grounded entirely in
Chiarella’s classical theory,273 which focused on the breach of a
disclosure duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
“between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that
corporation.”274 But Dirks then extended Chiarella’s holding to certain
tippees of corporate insiders who could be viewed as coparticipants in
an insider’s breach of duty to shareholders.275 And, according to Dirks,
disclosure by an insider to a person outside the corporation constituted
a breach of duty only when the insider was acting for a direct or
indirect personal benefit.276
The Dirks case had been a pivotal one for the securities industry
because the petitioner, Raymond Dirks, was a securities analyst who
had advised clients to sell securities based on highly negative
information relayed to him by corporate executives.277 The SEC urged
the Court to hold the analyst liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
for “aiding and abetting” his clients’ trading.278 But pursuant to its
response to “broker’s questions” posed by a registered representative who then traded
for himself and seventeen clients); SEC v. Lum’s, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1058
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (issuer and its President/Chief Operating Officer violated Rule 10b-5
when disclosures were made to an institutional salesman, who shared the material
nonpublic information with trading clients); Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633,
645–46 (1971) (investment advisers violated Rule 10b-5 when they traded securities on
the basis of material nonpublic information obtained from broker-dealer retained by
securities issuer); see also Langevoort, supra note 266, at 1027 (discussing selective
disclosure in the early stages of Rule 10b-5’s doctrinal development).
271. 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
272. Id. at 9. Teetering was necessary because, even under a
parity-of-information view of insider trading, analysts were allowed to obtain
immaterial nonpublic information for purposes of “filling interstices in analysis.”
Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. at 646.
273. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
274. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
275. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
276. See supra Part I.B.2.
277. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–51.
278. Id. at 651 (quoting the SEC’s position that “[w]here ‘tippees’—regardless
of their motivation or occupation—come into possession of material ‘corporate
information that they know is confidential and know or should know came from a
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personal benefit test for tipper/tippee liability, the Court found that the
analyst had no duty to abstain from using the information.279 The
information pertained to a widespread fraud that had been occurring at
the Equity Funding Corporation, and the Court found that the current
and former insiders who had revealed the fraud to the analyst had not
acted improperly for a personal benefit.280 As the Court explained:
The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for
revealing Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was their purpose to
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of
this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a
desire to expose the fraud. In the absence of a breach of duty
to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative breach
by Dirks. Dirks therefore could not have been “a participant
after the fact in [an] insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.”281
In so holding, the Court recognized that the analyst’s clients
possessed an informational advantage over all other traders who lacked
knowledge about Equity Funding’s likely demise. But the Court
observed that “winner and losers” are inevitable in markets where
investors act on incomplete or incorrect information, and it emphasized
that “those who have ‘lost’ have not necessarily been defrauded.”282
Significantly, as Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent, the former
officer of Equity Funding who revealed the ongoing fraud had also, in a
sense, benefitted personally from “the good feeling of exposing a fraud
and his enhanced reputation.283 Thus, in Dirks itself, an “enhanced
reputation” in the abstract did not constitute an improper personal
benefit triggering a disclose or abstain obligation under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.
Underscoring much of the analysis in Dirks was the Court’s
twofold concern for market efficiency and predictable rules for Rule
10b-5 liability, particularly in the context of communications between
corporate executives and securities analysts. In the Court’s view:
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an
corporate insider,’ they must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading”).
279. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
280. Id. at 666–67.
281. Id. at 667 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
282. Id. at 667 n.27.
283. Id. at 676 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on
the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It is
commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze
information,” and this often is done by meeting with and
questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders.
And information that the analysts obtain normally may be the
basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation’s
securities.284
Rather than focusing on the analyst’s clients and the stock market
losses they managed to avoid, the Court emphasized the central role
that Dirks had “played in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and
that analysts in general can play in revealing information that
corporations may have reason to withhold from the public.”285 The
Court further observed that, in the absence of guidance “as to where
the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses,
neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is
crossed.”286 Thus, while a broader interpretation of the insider trading
prohibitions arising under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could have
been reconciled with the common law, the Court eschewed that
possibility and defined “illegal tipping” in a way that did not
disincentivize securities analysts from gathering and analyzing
nonpublic corporate information that contributed to pricing efficiency.
There is little doubt that Dirks achieved the Court’s desired effect:
the decision provided corporate executives and securities analysts with
a safety net for their tightrope. Corporate executives were routinely
advised that the “‘personal benefit’ test provide[d] significant insulation
against liability for selective disclosures of material nonpublic
information to analysts.”287 And securities analysts were likewise
counseled that they could trade on any material nonpublic information
that they uncovered or could advise their clients to trade, “[u]nless the
analyst is knowingly aiding an insider to benefit from the use of
information about his company.”288 Of course, for corporate executives
284. Id. at 658–59 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Raymond L. Dirks,
Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1406 (Jan. 22, 1981)).
285. Id. at 658 n.18.
286. Id. at 658 n.17.
287. Richard M. Phillips & Gregory T. Nojeim, Disclosures to Securities
Analysts: The Drafty Exposure of the Open-Door Policy, INSIGHTS, May 1990, at 3, 7.
288. Meyer Eisenberg, Dirks v. S.E.C.: Implications for Financial Analysts, in
THE NEW FACE OF INSIDER TRADING: CHIARELLA, DIRKS, AND BEYOND X, X (ALI-ABA
Course of Study 1983), quoted in John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Securities
Analyst, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1991, at 5 n.12.
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as well as analysts, the harbor in Dirks would be safe only if there were
legitimate reasons for relaying the material nonpublic information that
had been used for securities trading. But, as many observed,
disclosures to analysts served a variety of corporate ends, “such as to
enhance the company’s standing with the investor community or to
strengthen pre-existing lines of communication.”289 Accordingly, in the
words of one distinguished scholar, the Court’s “language in Dirks
once seemed a Magna Charta for securities analysis.”290
2. THE SEC’S PRE-REGULATION FD ATTEMPTS TO LEVEL THE PLAYING
FIELD

In the immediate aftermath of Dirks, SEC officials floated trial
balloons that questioned the comfort that corporate executives and
securities analysts could draw from the decision. For example, one
SEC official, then a branch chief in the Division of Enforcement, called
attention to “the anomalous and undefined nature of a ‘personal
benefit.’”291 He then provided a cautionary example: if a securities
analyst is employed by a financial publication, a corporate executive
should “consider whether a personal benefit could be alleged based on a
past article favorable to the insider’s reputation or the potential for such
an article in the future.”292 He also criticized Dirks for giving short
shrift to the notions of fairness and market integrity that underlie the
federal securities laws and for sacrificing small investors “in the
interest of pricing efficiency.”293 He therefore argued for an expansive
view of the personal benefit test, which, in his view, would better
balance the competing policy interests at stake.294
In 1991, the SEC sought to create a more level playing field for all
investors through a frontal attack on selective disclosure, with Dirks’
reference to a “reputational benefit” as the sword. Its target was a
corporate executive who was charged with illegal tipping under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.295 According to the SEC’s complaint,
Philip Stevens, the CEO of Ultrasystems Corporation, made a series of
unsolicited calls to certain securities analysts to inform them of lower
than expected quarterly results prior to an official public
289. Langevoort, supra note 266, at 1024.
290. Coffee, supra note 288, at 6.
291. Bruce A. Hiler, Dirks v. SEC—A Study in Cause and Effect, 43 MD. L.
REV. 292, 314 (1984).
292. Id. at 315–16.
293. Id. at 297–98, 341.
294. Id. at 317–23.
295. Phillip J. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 SEC Docket 739,
739 (Mar. 19, 1991).
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announcement.296 Two of the analysts shared these new quarterly
figures with their clients and those clients sold their holdings in
Ultrasystems, thereby avoiding substantial losses.297 The SEC argued
that Stevens’ motivation in making his disclosure was “to protect and
enhance his reputation.”298 The case was settled and thus the SEC’s
position was never tested in court.299
The reaction to the Stevens case was predictable. Advocates for
individual investors hailed it as an important victory,300 but publicly
traded companies, along with the securities industry, were startled by
the defeat.301 Corporate and securities lawyers were likewise surprised
by the settlement, with many criticizing the SEC for “gutting” Dirks.302
The scholarly consensus was that the theory in Stevens “trivialize[d]
Dirks” and would extend to most communications between corporate
executives and securities analysts.303 As Professor John Coffee saw it,
“to the extent that any ‘reputational benefit’ resulted from Stevens’
296. Id.
297. Id. at 740.
298. Id. at 739.
299. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Stevens consented to the entry of a
permanent injunction and agreed to pay approximately $126,500 (the sum total of the
monetary losses that had been avoided by the analyst’s clients who sold their stock in
Ultrasystems prior to the company’s public announcement). Id. In Professor Coffee’s
view, the Stevens case “shows a defendant unwilling to fight even when it had a
substantial prospect for a litigated victory.” Coffee, supra note 288, at 6.
300. See, e.g., Dean Foust, Commentary, The Do’s and Don’ts of Feeding
Wall Street Analysts, BUS. WK., Apr. 8, 1991, at 27, 27 (critiquing the Stevens
settlement and concluding that “[i]n an era in which small investors feel handicapped
when competing against well-connected institutional traders, the SEC in this case is
right on the money”), cited in Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Insider/Tipper, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at 5, 5.
301. See, e.g., Carl W. Schneider, Fencing on the Electrified Tightrope:
Shocking Executives Who Value Reputation, INSIGHTS, July 1991, at 2, 14 (observing
that a “simple desire by the executive to do his or her job effectively and well was not
normally considered to [constitute] an improper purpose”).
302. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Issuer Communications with
Analysts, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 22, 1991, at 5, 6 (bemoaning that the SEC’s overly broad
interpretation of the reputational benefit prong “could make that element of proof
meaningless”); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, For the Issuer, It’s

Sometimes Tempting to Provide Analysts with Non-Public Information. But Selective
Disclosures Can Be Perilous, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at B4, B6 (contending that

the SEC’s case “was built on a dubious theory,” but speculating that the defendant
likely settled rather than “wait for such vindication”); Schneider, supra note 301, at 14
(arguing that “by adroit pleading, the Commission, which lost Dirks, can proceed as
though it had won, gutting the principle that the case generally was thought to have
established”).
303. Coffee, supra note 288, at 5; see also Merritt B. Fox, Regulation FD and
Foreign Issuers: Globalization’s Strains and Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 653, 662
(2001) (discussing reactions to the Stevens settlement).
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conduct, it accrued to Ultrasystems and all of its shareholders
proportionately, and thus should not amount to a ‘personal gain’ for
purposes of Dirks.”304 He and others further emphasized the substantial
chilling effect that Stevens’ reputational benefit theory was likely to
have on issuer communications with securities analysts.305
The SEC appeared to take these concerns to heart. Although after
Stevens, SEC officials continued to warn corporate executives and
securities analysts about the perils of selective disclosure, the agency
did not initiate subsequent Rule 10b-5 litigation based on a reputational
benefit theory.306 Nor did the SEC seek to redefine a corporate
executive’s selective disclosure to a securities analyst as an illegal tip
under the misappropriation theory. Such an attempt would have been
futile because, as previously explained, the crux of the
misappropriation theory is an agent’s undisclosed personal gain from
the use of his principal’s information.307
The SEC did, however, continue to categorize selective disclosure
as an “increasingly worrisome form of trading on the basis of
non-public information.”308 In addition to its concerns about diminished
investor confidence in securities markets, the SEC feared that corporate
executives were withholding important information from the public so
that they could curry favor with particular analysts or investors.309 As
market volatility increased toward the end of the 1990s, the media
began to highlight specific incidents of unfair selective disclosure and
“[t]he problem took on increased urgency.”310 In a series of town hall
meetings across the country, Chairman Levitt vowed to make
Coffee, supra note 288, at 6.
See id.; Theodore A Levine & W. Hardy Callcott, SEC Examines
Relationship between Issuers and Analysts, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 7, 8 (arguing
304.
305.

that under the SEC’s rationale, “any corporate executive who ever reveals non-public
information to an analyst risks insider trading liability . . . because the SEC will always
be able to allege that the executive made the tip for the purpose of enhancing his or her
reputation”).
306. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 31, at 1061 (observing that after the widely
criticized Stevens settlement, “the SEC stopped bringing selective disclosure actions
based on Section 10(b)”); Fox, supra note 303, at 662 (“Research does not reveal any
subsequent case in which the SEC tried to utilize this theory again to pursue anyone
either engaging in selective disclosure or acting on it.”).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 182–188. But see Wang, supra note
31, at 871–74 (acknowledging the “conventional wisdom” that selective disclosure is
seldom illegal, but theorizing that the issuer itself could incur classical theory liability if
the issuer, “as an entity, [obtains] reciprocal benefits by tipping analysts”).
308. Levitt, supra note 267.
309. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,848
(Dec. 20, 1999).
310. Fisch & Sale, supra note 31, at 1061–62.
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eradicating selective disclosure a top priority. His frustration was
palpable: “Legally, you can split hairs all you want. But, ethically, it’s
very clear: If analysts or their firms are trading—knowing this
information, and prior to public release—it’s just as wrong as if
corporate insiders did it.”311
Privileging certain investors with material nonpublic information
may well have been “wrong, plain and simple.”312 But selectively
disclosing that information, or trading on that information, was seldom
illegal, “plain and simple.” Unwilling to risk litigation losses based on
the nebulous theory of a reputational benefit and concerned about that
strategy’s chilling effect even if were courts were to uphold it,313 the
SEC had to look beyond the federal insider trading prohibition in order
to level the playing field for all securities investors.

B. Regulation FD
In December 1999, when the SEC proposed its initial version of
Regulation FD, Chairman Levitt made good on his promise to end the
routine practice of selective disclosure in the private sector.314 Although
predicated on the belief that “all investors should have access to an
issuer’s material disclosures at the same time,”315 the proposed
regulation did not proscribe selective disclosure as a “deceptive device
or contrivance” under Section 10(b).316 Instead, it was made pursuant to
the SEC’s authority under Exchange Act Section 13(a),317 which
empowers the agency to mandate ongoing disclosure by publicly traded

311. Levitt, supra note 267.
312. LEVITT, supra note 32, at 87.
313. See Panel Discussion: The SEC’s Regulation FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 273, 279 (2001) (statement by former SEC Commissioner and General Counsel
Harvey Goldschmid) (contending that the agency could have won “the
extension-of-Dirks case at the Supreme Court . . . [but] there would or might be a
heavy price to pay for doing so”).
314. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,846
(Dec. 20, 1999). Much of the background in this Section is based on the more extensive
discussion in RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON
INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 7.08[3] (2012).
315. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,847
(Dec. 20, 1999). But see Choi, supra note 31, at 564 (observing that Regulation FD
also acts “as a preventive device to protect against possible opportunistic uses of
selective disclosures where determination of whether managers are acting
opportunistically is difficult”).
316. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
317. § 78m(a).
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companies.318 After a lengthy period of notice and comment, Regulation
FD was revised and adopted in August 2000, with an effective date of
October 15, 2000.319 It reflects a clear policy decision to regulate
issuers and their disclosures rather than securities investors and their
trading.
Rule 100 of Regulation FD sets forth a “general rule regarding
selective disclosure.”320 As summarized in the SEC’s adopting release,
the rule requires that whenever:
(1) an issuer, or person acting on its behalf,
(2) discloses material nonpublic information,
(3) to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities
market professionals or holders of the issuer’s securities who
may well trade on the basis of the information),
(4) the issuer must make public disclosure of that same
information
(a) simultaneously (for intentional disclosures), or
(b) promptly (for nonintentional disclosures).321
Accordingly, although Regulation FD does not automatically require a
publicly traded company to promptly disclose all material events as they
occur, it does in fact require that when a company chooses to disclose
material nonpublic information to a person covered by the regulation,
“it must do so in a manner that provides general public disclosure,
rather than through a selective disclosure” to a favored few.322
Regulation FD, as adopted, differs in at least two principal
respects from the version originally proposed.323 First, in the final
318. In addition to issuers with a class of securities registered under Exchange
Act Section 12, Regulation FD applies to issuers required to file reports under
Exchange Act Section 15(d) and to closed-end investment companies, but it does not
apply to any other investment companies or any foreign government or foreign private
issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (2012).
319. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,676 (Aug.
15, 2000).
320. § 243.100.
321. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,680–81
(Aug. 15, 2000).
322. Id. at 83,681; see Robert B. Thompson & Ronald King, Credibility and
Information in Securities Markets after Regulation FD, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 615, 615
(2001) (emphasizing that under Regulation FD “companies now face an all or nothing
choice: they are not required to disclose any more information than before, but if they
tell someone, they must tell everyone”).
323. In its adopting release, the SEC highlighted the “outpouring of public
comment” that was triggered in response to its proposal to add Regulation FD to the
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version of the regulation, the SEC sought to narrow the scope by
regulating only those communications from an issuer to one of four
specifically enumerated categories of persons and associated persons:
(1) broker-dealers, (2) investment advisers or institutional investment
managers, (3) investment companies or hedge funds, and (4) holders of
the issuer’s securities, “under circumstances in which it is reasonably
foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the issuer’s securities
on the basis of the information.”324 The initial proposal did not contain
this limitation, applying instead to all communications with persons
outside the issuer.325 In its adopting release, the SEC acknowledged that
an application to all communications might “inappropriately interfere
with ordinary-course business communications with parties such as
customers, suppliers, strategic partners, and government regulators”
and might also inhibit communications with the media.326 Second, to
further ensure the free flow of ordinary-course business
communications, the SEC restricted the types of issuer personnel who
are covered by the regulation to only senior officials or other persons
who “regularly communicate with securities market professionals or
security holders.”327
Regulation FD also explicitly exempts communications to “a
person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer (such as an
attorney, investment banker, or accountant),”328 as well as to other
persons who “expressly agree[] to maintain the disclosed information in
confidence.”329 These exemptions thus recognize that issuers and their
officials may continue to share material nonpublic information with
outsiders for legitimate business reasons, but that any trading (or
tipping) based on that information would subject the recipient to Rule
federal securities laws. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at
83,677–78 (Aug. 15, 2000) (observing receipt of nearly 6000 comment letters, the vast
majority of which were from individual investors urging adoption of the regulation).
324. § 243.100(b)(1)(i).
325. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,680 (Aug.
15, 2000).
326. Id. at 83,681
327. Id. at 83,680.
328. § 243.100(a)(2)(i).
329. § 243.100(a)(2)(ii). The SEC has made clear that while an agreement to
maintain confidentiality must be express, the agreement need not be a written one—“an
express oral agreement will suffice.” Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 86,319, at 83,682 n.28 (Aug. 15, 2000). Moreover, agreements entered into after the
disclosure is made, but before the information’s recipient discloses or trades on the
basis of it, are sufficient as well. Id.
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10b-5 liability as a “temporary insider” of the issuer under the classical
theory of insider trading330 or pursuant to the misappropriation
theory.331 Here it is important to recognize that on the same day it
adopted Regulation FD, the SEC also adopted SEC Rule 10b5-2, a new
insider trading rule setting forth three nonexclusive circumstances under
which a person can be deemed to have a duty of trust or confidence for
purposes of the misappropriation theory.332 One of those circumstances
imposes a duty “[w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in
confidence.”333 Yet, notwithstanding the plain text of Rule
10b5-2(b)(1), at least one court has held that mere confidentiality
agreements, absent an explicit or implicit promise not to use
confidential information in one’s own securities trading, cannot create a
duty sufficient to support Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability under
the misappropriation theory.334
The many definitional provisions set out in Regulation FD provide
additional clarification with respect to the scope and effect of the
general rule. For example, Rule 101(a) defines the selective disclosure
of material nonpublic information as “intentional” when “the person
making the disclosure either knows, or was reckless in not knowing,
that the information he or she is communicating is both material and
nonpublic.”335 When such intentional disclosures occur, the issuer is
required to publicly disclose the same information “simultaneously.”336
The clear intent behind the SEC’s “simultaneous” disclosure
requirement is to prohibit senior company officials from intentionally
making selective disclosures to those persons who are most likely to
trade on that information. Rule 101(d) then states that when a corporate
official makes a “non-intentional disclosure” of material nonpublic

330. See supra note 150 (discussing Dirks’ extension of the classical theory to
temporary insiders).
331. See supra text accompanying note 138.
332. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,696–97
(Aug. 15, 2000).
333. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1).
334. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 728 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that
the defendant’s alleged trading on information subject to a confidentiality agreement
would not have been deceptive under Section 10(b) unless the SEC could also show that
defendant “agreed, expressly or implicitly, to refrain from trading on or otherwise
using for his own benefit the information the CEO was about to share”), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
335. § 243.101(a).
336. § 243.100(a)(1).
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information,337 the issuer must make public disclosure of that
information “promptly.”338
Regulation FD also provides an issuer with a significant degree of
choice as to how to make the requisite “public disclosures.” One option
would be for the issuer to make the disclosure by filing a Form 8-K
with the SEC.339 Alternatively, the issuer could “disseminate[] the
information through another method (or combination of methods) of
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad,
nonexclusionary distribution of the information to the public.”340 Thus,
an issuer could accomplish the public disclosure through an
announcement at a press conference or in a conference call, provided
that the public is given “adequate notice” of the conference or call and
the means for accessing it.341 The adopting release further emphasized
that “[t]he regulation does not require use of a particular method, or
establish a ‘one size fits all’ standard for disclosure.”342 Instead, the
SEC opted to “leave[] the decision to the issuer to choose methods that
are reasonably calculated to make effective, broad, and nonexclusionary
public disclosure, given the particular circumstances of that issuer.”343
In 2008, the SEC issued a new release providing issuers with much
needed guidance as to when information posted on a website could be
deemed publicly available within the meaning of Regulation FD.344
337. For instance, a disclosure would be “non-intentional” if a corporate
official were to disclose confidential information “inadvertently through an honest slip
of the tongue” or if the official mistakenly (but not recklessly) believed that the
information was not material or had already been made public. See Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,853 (Dec. 20, 1999).
338. § 243.101(d). The term “promptly” is defined to mean:
[A]s soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24
hours or the commencement of the next day’s trading on the New York
Stock Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer . . . learns that there
has been a non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or person acting on
behalf of the issuer of information that the senior official knows, or is
reckless in not knowing, is both material and nonpublic.

Id.
339. See § 243.101(e)(1).
340. § 243.101(e)(2).
341. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,687 (Aug.
15, 2000).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. See Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-58288, 2008 WL 4068202, at *9 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter SEC
Guidance on Corporate Web Sites]. The release emphasized consideration of three
factors: (1) whether a company’s website is “a recognized channel of distribution,” (2)
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Absent from Regulation FD is any attempt to define “material”
information. Rather, the SEC opted to rely on the existing definitions
“established in the case law.”345 Although it recognized that
“materiality judgments can be difficult,”346 the SEC decided against
“set[ting] forth a bright-line test, or an exclusive list of ‘material’ items
for purposes of Regulation FD.”347 The adopting release did, however,
make clear that nothing in Regulation FD would prohibit an issuer from
sharing “a non-material piece of information [with a securities] analyst,
even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete
a ‘mosaic’ of information that, taken together, is material.”348 The SEC
also emphasized that since materiality is an objective standard turning
on the decision-making of a reasonable investor, “Regulation FD will
not be implicated where an issuer discloses immaterial information
whose significance is discerned by the analyst.”349

C. Evaluating Regulation FD a Decade Later
From the time Regulation FD was first considered, the possibility
that it might chill corporate disclosures to analysts, investors, and the
media was considered its principal cost. Indeed, commentators feared
that it might cause issuers to speak less frequently and with a greater
degree of abstraction, because corporate officials would fear a post hoc
judicial or administrative determination that the disclosed information
was material.350 And in the immediate aftermath of Regulation FD’s
adoption, evaluations and feedback from both corporate issuers and
securities analysts indicated that a chilling effect might have
occurred.351 Much of the commentary that followed a year or two later,
whether website posting disseminates information in a manner that makes it generally
available to the securities market, and (3) whether there has been “a reasonable waiting
period for investors and the market to react to the posted information.” Id. at *6.
345. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,683 (Aug.
15, 2000).
346. Id. at 83,684.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 83,684–85.
349. Id. at 83,685.
350. See id. at 83,701 (citing comment letters from the Securities Industry
Association, the Bond Market Association, and the American Bar Association).
351. See, e.g., Industry Participants Want SEC to Issue Guidance on
Regulation FD, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 637 (Apr. 30, 2001) (“The
analyst community has been particularly vocal in its opposition to the rule, claiming
that issuers have clammed up, often unnecessarily, because of ambiguity surrounding
Regulation FD.”); Most Companies Seeking to Comply with Reg FD Disclosure
Requirements, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 586 (Apr. 23, 2001) (noting
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however, “suggest[ed] that the purported negative effects of Regulation
FD on information flow and volatility may be overstated.”352 Instead,
many issuers quickly adapted their disclosure practices in a manner that
increased the general public’s access to corporate information.353 For
example, in the year following Regulation FD’s adoption, issuer use of
webcasts quadrupled, which provided the public with access to earnings
conference calls and in-person meetings with analysts.354 Some issuers
also argued that Regulation FD abridges commercial speech protected
by the First Amendment.355 But the SEC has defended the regulation as
an appropriate time, place, and manner regulation of commercial
activity that mandates speech only when information has been
previously or simultaneously disclosed to regulated professionals or
holders of the issuer’s securities who are likely to trade.356
Today, more than a decade after Regulation FD’s adoption, SEC
officials continue to laud the regulation as a tremendous success.357
While that self-evaluation is hardly surprising, even organizations that
often function as the SEC’s nemesis have offered a positive evaluation.
that “[t]he regulation has been controversial in some circles, with groups contending it
has hampered the release of information important to investors,” and that “[i]ssuers, in
some cases, have complained that compliance with the regulation is too complex and
uncertain”).
352. Fisch & Sale, supra note 31, at 1066–68 (discussing empirical research in
the immediate aftermath of Regulation FD); see also Robert J. Conner, Regulation FD:
Its Creation, Its Authority, Its Possible Impact, 28 SEC. REG. L.J. 233, 263 (2000)
(contending that “issuers’ fears may not be as real as they appear”).
353. See Jill E. Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing
Information Asymmetry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING (Stephen
Bainbridge
ed.)
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2042696.
354. See Aaron J. VanGetson, Note, Real-Time Disclosure of Securities
Information via the Internet: Real Time or Not Right Now?, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 551, 565 (citing LAURA S. UNGER, SEC, SPECIAL STUDY: REGULATION FAIR
DISCLOSURE REVISITED (2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
regfdstudy.htm).
355. See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is
Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 47–60 (2005).
356. The SEC has initiated a dozen or so enforcement actions charging
securities issuers and/or their corporate executives with violations of Regulation FD.
See FERRARA, NAGY & THOMAS, supra note 314, at § 7.08[3][b] (discussing Regulation
FD proceedings). In the only Reg FD proceeding that was litigated rather than settled,
the court held that the allegations in the SEC’s complaint did not support its claim that
the defendants had privately disclosed material nonpublic information. SEC v. Siebel
Systems, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Having granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, the court “decline[d] to opine on the
constitutional challenges raised.” Id. at 709 n.16.
357. See, e.g., LEVITT, supra note 32, at 89 (“I now believe Reg FD has done
more to restore investor confidence in the stock market than any other rule the SEC
adopted during my tenure [as Chairman].”).
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For instance, the Business Roundtable, which is comprised of the CEOs
of 160 leading corporations,358 wrote to then-SEC Chairman William
Donaldson in 2005: We “believe[] that Regulation FD has been
successful in accomplishing the Commission’s goal of promoting full
and fair disclosure. We also believe Regulation FD has had the
important and beneficial effect of enhancing investor confidence in the
marketplace. For these reasons . . . [we] continue[] to support
Regulation FD.”359 Finance scholars have also been carefully tracking
Regulation FD’s operations, though, as Professor Jill Fisch has recently
summarized, the mixed results of the extensive empirical research make
it difficult to reach definitive assessments.360 She observes, however,
that “[t]here is substantial evidence that Regulation FD reduced
selective disclosure and information asymmetries” and that these
reductions in asymmetries have a beneficial effect to the market.361 On
the other hand, “[a]t least some studies have found reduced overall
disclosure, especially by smaller firms.”362 Yet she draws one
conclusion that is equally relevant to the practice of selective disclosure
by federal officials: “the disclosure-based structure of Regulation FD
appears better suited to balancing competing policy considerations in
this area than the blunt force of antifraud liability.”363
III. AN FGD REGIME FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
In the private sector, the SEC was able to curtail unfair selective
disclosure only when it shifted its attention away from securities
analysts and what they did with the information they gathered, and
focused instead on securities issuers and the ways in which corporate
executives were disseminating material nonpublic information. Given
the rare bipartisanship and rapid momentum that led to the passage of
the STOCK Act,364 now is an opportune time to address the federal
government’s own problem with selective disclosure.
358. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir. Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks before the
Directors’ Education Institute at Duke University: Staying the Course (Mar. 18, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch031805smc.htm.
359. Id. (quoting a letter from Business Roundtable to William Donaldson,
SEC Chairman).
360. Fisch, supra note 353, at 18–19.
361. Id. at 19 (citing sources including William J. Kross & Inho Suk, Does
Regulation FD Work? Evidence from Analysts’ Reliance on Public Disclosure, 53 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 225 (2012); and Praveen Sinha & Christopher Gadarowski, The
Efficacy of Regulation Fair Disclosure, 45 FIN. REV. 331 (2010)).
362. Id. (citing Edward R. Lawrence et al., Effect of Regulation FD on
Disclosures of Information by Firms, 21 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 979 (2011)).
363. Id. at 24.
364. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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This final Part of this Article sets out a framework designed to
enhance the internal controls on federal officials who may interact with
securities investors or consultants seeking to profit from political
intelligence. We first discuss generally some of the challenges that
likely will arise in designing an FGD regime. We then suggest seven
possible measures for achieving fairer government disclosure. We
intend to build on these FGD measures with more specific proposals in
a subsequent article. Here, however, we begin the conversation by
suggesting immediate steps that federal officials could take either
individually or through directives issued by agency heads and
congressional committees.

A. Challenges for Developing an FGD Regime
The development of an FGD regime for federal officials implicates
several unique challenges that the SEC did not have to tackle in
designing Regulation FD for publicly traded corporations and their
executives. But these challenges should not impede a commitment to
eliminating—or at least curtailing—the unfair selective disclosures that
have been a tradition in the federal government for far too long.365
First, those working toward fairer government disclosure would
have to recognize that a broad range of individuals and entities expect
prompt disclosure of nonpublic government information that affects
them directly. If the government does not wish to release such
information to the general public (or wishes to delay the release),366
these affected persons expect, and in many instances deserve, selective
disclosure. But individuals and entities lacking any intention to trade
securities may inadvertently function as conduits for others who are
seeking to gain an informational edge. For instance, a hedge fund
trader deciding whether to short the stock of for-profit colleges could
possibly gather nonpublic DOE information from community college
officials who are eager to learn what the DOE is planning to do about
alleged abuses by their for-profit competitors.367 The quest to deny an
365. See supra Part I.A. Although we have little doubt that selective disclosure
of market-moving government information is a problem at the state and local level as
well, our attention is focused on the federal government. Many of our ideas and
suggestions, however, would be appropriate for state and local governments as well.
366. Professor Cass Sunstein identified five justifications often invoked by the
government for suppressing, or delaying, its release of information: protecting military
plans, facilitating negotiations, facilitating uninhibited deliberations within the
government, avoiding interest-group pressures, and avoiding distrust and suspicion,
encouraging communications from others. Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of
Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 889, 895–96 (1986).
367. Cf. supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
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informational edge to some securities investors should not diminish the
flow of government information to those individuals and entities that
need nonpublic information to organize interests and activities that have
nothing at all to do with investments in securities markets.
Moreover, as we have seen, securities investors will often acquire
selectively disclosed government information while they are also
seeking to influence government decision making.368 Whereas corporate
managers generally are not expected to be in constant communication
with persons trying to influence corporate conduct and decision
making, federal officials—particularly elected officials—are expected to
communicate with a host of different constituencies. Keeping their jobs
may depend upon how well these officials communicate information, to
whom, and how quickly. The right to petition the government for
redress of grievances is not only constitutionally protected,369 it has
become a multi-billion dollar business,370 and lobbying activity is often
interwoven with political intelligence gathering.
An FGD regime would likewise have to address the very frequent
communications that federal officials have with the media, which
nowadays includes Internet sites, Twitter, subscription services, and
other outlets in addition to traditional newspapers, radio, and television.
Indeed, a political intelligence consultant may be able to attend a
government press briefing as a journalist of sorts, and even some
journalists from mainstream media organizations fall into a gray area
because their newsletters offer specialized subscriptions to investment
professionals.371 With Regulation FD, however, the SEC did not have
to contend with this challenge because the regulation restricts the
disclosure of material nonpublic information only when certain
corporate executives communicate with regulated market professionals
or holders of the issuer’s securities who are likely to trade.372

368. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying
that occurred in 1789 with respect to the payment of Revolutionary War debts); supra
notes 103–106 and accompanying text (discussing a well-known hedge fund manager
and his communications with the Department of Education).
369. Nicholas W. Allard, Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to
369. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying
that occurred in 1789 with respect to the payment of Revolutionary War debts); supra
notes 103–106 and accompanying text (discussing a well-known hedge fund manager
and his communications with the Department of Education).
Petition and the Competition to Be Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 36–42 (2008)
(discussing constitutional dimensions of public policy advocacy).
370. Id. at 49–50.
371. See infra Part III.B.6.
372. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i) to (iv) (2012); see also supra text
accompanying note 324.
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Finally, an FGD regime would have to recognize that federal
officials often make selective disclosures of market-moving information
to individuals and entities from whom the government is seeking
cooperation, information, and guidance.373 Moreover, in crisis
situations such as wartime, acts of terrorism, or economic collapse,
such “necessary” selective disclosure must often be undertaken quickly,
informally, and on a relatively broad scale. The Department of
Homeland Security, for instance, might selectively disclose to airlines
information about a major security threat that, unless resolved quickly,
is likely to shut down air traffic for a prolonged period of time.
Another example of necessary selective disclosure occurred in
September 2008, when officials from the Treasury Department, the
SEC, and the Federal Reserve met with Wall Street executives in an
attempt to resolve the financial crisis.374 Indeed, market-moving
information about the government’s decision to allow Lehman Brothers
to fail was disclosed selectively to some on Wall Street in the days
preceding the firm’s bankruptcy filing on Monday, September 15,
2008,375 and perhaps even in the months preceding Lehman’s failure.
Yet some of this necessary selective disclosure may have occurred
contemporaneously with other types of selective disclosure, such as the
Secretary of the Treasury’s reported briefings to hedge funds and
investment bankers about the government’s planned response to the
situation at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.376
Although legitimate, good faith disclosures of material nonpublic
government information to securities investors are frequently necessary
and appropriate, federal officials often appear to make selective
disclosures in the absence of any formal policy addressing, among other
issues: (1) when federal officials may disclose market-moving
information selectively and to whom, (2) when and how a public
announcement of that information will be made, and (3) whether federal
officials will procure an agreement from the information’s recipients to
maintain confidentiality and not to use that information for securities
trading purposes. An FGD regime could help sort out the necessary
selective disclosures from the unnecessary and could establish better
373. See Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 15 (citing statements by lawmakers as
to the value of feedback from hedge funds and other investors).
374. See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy
Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 179 (2010)
(statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC) (“Over the weekend of September
12th - 14th, representatives from the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and the Commission met with management from Lehman and other major financial
firms in an effort to address the situation.”).
375. Id.
376. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
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procedures and protocols for how necessary selective disclosure will be
conducted. On the other hand, an FGD regime will have to give the
government flexibility in many situations and even more flexibility in
crisis situations.

B. Possible Measures for Fairer Government Disclosure
We sketch out below seven distinct measures that federal officials
could adopt to create a more level playing field for all securities
investors. None of these measures, even taken together, would amount
to a Reg FD-like all-or-nothing prohibition of selective disclosure.
Indeed, for a host of reasons including those set out above, an FGD
regime obligating all federal officials in all three branches of the
government to simultaneously disclose material nonpublic information
to all securities investors simply could not be reconciled with the size
and complexities of our federal government. Without a bevy of
exceptions (which could perhaps swallow the general rule), the end
result would be a triple whammy: a reduced flow of information out of
the government, a less informed populace, and less efficient securities
markets. In contrast, adherence to FGD measures along the lines we
describe could go a long way toward increasing the flow of government
information for everyone, while decreasing the investment edges that
have long enabled privileged investors to beat out ordinary
citizen-investors. Thus, an FGD regime could boost confidence not
only in the integrity of securities markets but also in the integrity of the
federal government itself.
1. PRESENT THE CASE FOR FGD TO THE PUBLIC
As an initial and important step, the President could announce
fairer government disclosure as a major policy initiative. He could
begin by acknowledging, in general terms, some of the unfair selective
disclosures that have occurred in the past, and he could pledge to make
more equal access to market-moving government information a top
administrative priority.377 The President could then instruct all
executive agencies and departments to review their internal controls for
interactions with persons outside the government likely to be seeking
information for personal profit in securities markets and he could

377. President Obama took a similar step when he endorsed the STOCK Act in
his 2012 State of the Union Address and suggested new legislation that would prohibit
“any elected official from owning stocks in industries they impact.” See supra note 23
and accompanying text.
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encourage congressional officials to do the same.378 He could also call
upon public interest groups, academics, and thinktanks—from both
sides of the political spectrum—to weigh in on proposed measures for
fairer government disclosure, much as organizations have already
begun to do in the debate over whether and how to regulate political
intelligence activity.379 Finally, the President could quote SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt as an effective reminder to all federal officials,
including members of Congress, that our democracy “has no tolerance
for favoritism,” that it “holds no place for privilege,” and that
“[w]ell-connected people don’t deserve any greater chance for success
[in securities markets] than the average citizen.”380 This appeal to
integrity would produce a two-fold benefit: it would encourage federal
officials to consider more thoughtfully the selective disclosures they
make and it would engender the same type of populist support that the
SEC drew at town hall meetings across the country prior to the
adoption of Regulation FD.381
378. As a more ambitious undertaking, the President could encourage Congress
to begin to explore the possibility of legislation that would make real-time public
disclosure of market-moving information more of a norm. Cf. OMB WATCH, MOVING
TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY RIGHT-TO-KNOW AGENDA: RECOMMENDATIONS TO
PRESIDENT-ELECT OBAMA AND CONGRESS 1–2 (2008), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/
11612 (advocating for “a government where . . . federal agencies proactively
disseminate information to the public in timely, easy-to-find, and searchable formats”
and calling upon President Obama and Congress to “act decisively to achieve this
vision”). Existing statutes—such as the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2006), which requires federal agencies to disclose their records upon request (subject
to exceptions), § 552, and the Government in the Sunshine Act, § 552b, which requires
every portion of every meeting of federal agencies to be open to the public (subject to
exceptions), § 552b—would provide a rough model of what such an omnibus real-time
disclosure statute could look like.
379. Compare Blair, supra note 250, at 16 (stating that “Public Citizen will
push lawmakers to support . . . legislative efforts” to regulate political intelligence
gathering and “will continue to fight to ensure that Wall Street can no longer secretly
troll the halls of Congress for privileged information to prop up its profiteering
schemes”), with John Berlau & David Bier, The Problems with the STOCK Act, NAT’L
REV. ONLINE (Feb. 14, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/
articles/290847/problems-stock-act-john-berlau (contending that proposed efforts to
regulate political intelligence threaten First Amendment values and “would muzzle the
communication necessary for sunlight and reform”).
380. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (quoting then-SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt).
381. See id.; see also text accompanying supra note 311. On his first day in
office, President Obama ordered the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue
an open government directive requiring federal agencies to take specific steps toward
greater transparency, participation, and collaboration. See Memorandum on
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009). But
neither that OMB directive, nor any of the open government initiatives that followed,
have been tailored specifically toward preventing the type of informational edge that
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2. ASSESS CURRENT PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS
The set of questions recently posed to the DOE382 and CMS383 can
serve as a useful template for self-studies that would assess procedures
and protocols currently in place at executive agencies and congressional
offices. These questions would prompt each executive agency as well as
individual members of Congress to describe their policies “for all
interactions with persons who are not government employees,
contractors, or subcontractors and seek information for profit [in
securities markets]” or to explain why the agency or congressional
office has “not created a policy.”384 With the STOCK Act’s mandated
GAO study of political intelligence gathering already underway,385 it is
possible that some self-assessment may already be occurring.
These self-studies could then be used to inform possible
rulemaking initiatives by executive agencies and congressional
committees. Agency rulemaking could offer persons outside the
government the opportunity to weigh in on an agency’s proposed FGD
policies and procedures, some of which might allow too much selective
disclosure, or, conversely, might reduce agency transparency by
discouraging disclosure. The House and Senate Ethics Committees
could likewise embody new policies and procedures in House and
Senate rules binding on all members. FGD rules for agency and
congressional officials, however, will be effective in altering
longstanding traditions only insofar as they are enforced. Indeed,
Regulation FD’s overall success in the private sector derives in large
part from the SEC’s readiness to initiate enforcement action against
issuers and corporate executives who violate the rules. But FGD
compliance would likely be monitored and enforced internally, by the
particular agency or committee that promulgated the rules.
Given the strict confidentiality norms observed by federal judges
and their staffs, selective disclosure of market-moving information is
not as likely to be a problem in the judicial branch as it is in the other

privilege investors routinely attain from their connections to the inside of government.
See
generally
Open
Government
Initiative,
WHITEHOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/open (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). In contrast, an FGD
Regime would be specifically aimed at the problem of selective disclosure and would be
geared toward effective solutions.
382. See Grassley DOE Letter, supra note 104.
383. See Grassley CMS Letter, supra note 107.
384. See Grassley DOE Letter, supra note 104, at 2.
385. See supra notes 231–233 and accompanying text.
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two branches.386 But the judiciary’s policy-making body, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, could use this occasion as an
opportunity to review and refine its confidentiality rules as well as its
procedures for announcing judicial decisions.
3. DESIGNATE ONE OR MORE FGD OVERSEERS
Progress toward fairer government disclosure would also be
facilitated through the appointment of one or more FGD overseers. In
the executive branch, for example, an official from the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a subdivision of the OMB,
could coordinate with agency heads and disseminate information and
best practices across agencies.387 In the legislative branch, one or more
persons could be charged with similar responsibilities in connection
with individual congressional offices. The Senate Select Committee on
Ethics and the House Committee on Ethics could, for instance, each
designate a particular staff counsel to perform this role.
4. GREATER USE OF THE INTERNET
Regulation FD prompted publicly traded companies to harness the
power of the Internet, which now provides the public with routine
access to earnings conference calls and in-person meetings between
corporate executives and securities analysts.388 We would hardly
support an FGD regime in which live webcasts were required for all
meetings and briefings between federal officials and outside parties. But
such webcasts might nonetheless be appropriate when senior agency
officials, or members of Congress and their senior staffs, participate in
briefings with political intelligence consultants, hedge funds, or other
investors who are likely to use government information to profit in
securities markets. An alternative to webcasts would be to post talking
points memoranda on the executive agency or congressional office
website, with the agency or office announcing that practice well in
advance so that its website becomes a “recognized channel of

386. But see supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing a leaking
scandal in 1919 involving a law clerk to United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph
McKenna).
387. OIRA already “oversees the implementation of government-wide policies
in several areas, including information quality and statistical standards.” About OIRA,
OFF.
OF
MGMT.
&
BUDGET,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg_administrator (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).
388. See supra note 354 and accompanying text (noting that issuer use of
webcasts quadrupled in the year following Regulation FD’s adoption).
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distribution” for new and important information.389 The principal
exceptions to the webcast or talking points protocols would involve
meetings and briefings with persons who have entered into
confidentiality agreements that include a promise not to use material
nonpublic information in securities trading,390 or meetings and briefings
in which agency or congressional officials are confident that material
nonpublic information will not be traded on or revealed.
Senior agency officials, as well as members of Congress and their
senior staffs, could also adopt a general practice of posting on websites
the time and place of their meetings and the names of attendees outside
the government. Although the content of the discussion at these
meetings would not need to be revealed, the disclosure of the meeting
itself (e.g., “Treasury Secretary meeting with Ms. A from XYZ, Inc.”
or “Congresswoman B meets with Mr. C”) would provide the public
with some useful information and would discourage unfair selective
disclosure of nonpublic information. This idea is hardly a new one: in
2006, the Sunlight Foundation launched a campaign (dubbed
“Operation Punch Clock”) to encourage members of Congress to post
their official daily schedules on the Internet.391
Lastly, federal agencies and congressional offices could make
greater use of the Internet by publicly posting material that could reveal
leanings, deliberations, or decisions that otherwise would be known
only by the well connected.392 One example of a “best practice” is the
389. SEC Guidance on Corporate Web Sites, supra note 344, at *6.
390. See infra Part III.B.5. Discussion of nonpublic government information at
certain broad categories of meetings, such as partisan political events and fundraisers,
could perhaps be prohibited outright. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–26 (2006),
already requires that executive branch officials attend such events only in their personal
capacity. So it would be difficult to justify a legitimate, good faith reason for the
disclosure of nonpublic government information at these events. On the other hand, a
blanket ban that would prohibit federal officials from disclosing material nonpublic
government information to certain categories of persons or entities (such as political
intelligence consultants, hedge funds, or other professional investors) would likely
trigger constitutional challenges under the Equal Protection Clause or First Amendment
(and may also implicate protections under the Speech or Debate Clause for
congressional officials). See supra Part I.B.3.b.
391. OpenCongress reports that five Senators and three Representatives
currently post their schedules online: Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Senator Mark
Begich (D-Alaska), Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Senator Bill Nelson (D-Fla.),
Senator Jon Tester (D-Mont.), Representative Kathy Castor (D-Fla.), Representative
Denny Rehberg (R-Mont.), and Representative John Yarmuth (D-Ky.). Members of
Congress
Posting
Schedules
Online,
OPENCONGRESS,
http://www.opencongress.org/wiki/Members_of_Congress_posting_schedules_online
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
392. See Zagorin, supra note 47 (discussing a proposal from
OpenTheGovernment.org, a coalition chaired by POGO, “under which federal
departments would routinely and pro-actively post to the Internet non-exempt
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s recently announced decision to
post on its website the surveys it sends to major financial firms ahead of
monetary-policy meetings.393 Because those surveys contain queries that
“can provide early clues to the Fed’s thinking,” same-day website
accessibility creates a leveler playing field for ordinary investors who
previously lacked access to these surveys.394 The following month, the
Fed announced its own new policy for public disclosure of federal
funds rate forecasts by its policy committee members.395 Although the
Fed has reasons to publicly disclose such internal deliberations beyond
avoiding unfair selective disclosure,396 the new Fed policy reduces that
risk as well.
5. CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS WITH NON-USE COMPONENTS
Regulation FD permits a corporate executive to selectively disclose
material nonpublic information to securities analysts, institutional
investors, and other persons who expressly agree—either orally or in
writing—to maintain the disclosed information in confidence.397
Although SEC Rule 10b5-2 provides that confidentiality agreements
create a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the misappropriation
theory of insider trading,398 many securities issuers now include a nonuse component that specifically obliges the recipient not to trade
securities on the basis of that information.399

information about issues of clear public concern for all to see, rather than passively
waiting for FOIA requests to open a window on their activities”).
393. Susan Pulliam, NY Fed Opens up Its Discussions with Banks, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 2011, at A4.
394. Id.
395. See Jon Hilsenrath & Luca Di Leo, Fed Will Detail Rate Plans, Easing
Market Guesswork, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203462304577138850741089974.html (“Under the plan, the Fed
will publish a range of forecasts for interest rates among the central bank’s 17
individual policy makers—including five board governors and 12 regional Fed bank
presidents.”).
396. See id. (“Mr. Bernanke wants to inject more clarity into how the Fed
makes decisions about the direction of rates, believing such guidance will reduce public
uncertainty about the Fed and give it more scope to manage the economy.”).
397. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv) (2012).
398. See § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2012).
399. See JAMES T. ROTHWELL, PIPEs Enforcement Actions, CORP. L. &
PRACT. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (2012) (“[I]f you want the recipient not to trade,
you had better be specific. The safest approach, of course, is to seek a written
contractual standstill from recipients.”); supra note 334 and accompanying text
(discussing the district court’s decision in SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D.
Tex. 2009)).
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Federal officials regularly employ confidentiality agreements with
a non-use component in their interactions with individuals and entities
outside the government who are serving as contractors. Specifically,
government contractors typically sign agreements that prohibit the
contractor and its affiliates from “[u]sing or releasing nonpublic
information received under the contract except under limited
conditions.”400 Moreover, to guard against organizational conflicts of
interest that would arise if nonpublic information were used in
competitive bidding situations, government contractors routinely set up
firewalls “to ensure that the personnel preparing a contractor’s proposal
do not have access to nonpublic information that the contractor obtained
in the performance of a related contract.”401
Using the model employed for federal contracting, other recipients
of the government’s material nonpublic information could also be asked
for assurances of confidentiality and non-use. If community college
officials, for example, wish to discuss information that the DOE is not
yet prepared to release publicly, the meeting could begin with a
statement by a DOE official that the information is not to be used for
securities trading, and that a confidentiality promise and nonuse
agreement are preconditions for continuing. Once those assurances are
given, DOE officials should then attempt to identify the nonpublic
information they convey, so that the community college officials are put
on notice as to what disclosures must be retained in confidence.
Senior agency officials and congressional officials should also
make greater use of confidentiality agreements with nonuse components
in the context of private meetings with political intelligence consultants,
as well as hedge fund managers and other investors, whose insight and
guidance are being sought on issues of policy. Then, if a hedge fund or
other investor trades securities while the agreement is still in place, or
if political consultants subject to an agreement share that information
with traders, the SEC or DOJ could pursue that person under the
misappropriation theory of insider trading: the nonuse and
confidentiality agreement creates the relationship of trust and
confidence that gives rise to a disclosure duty under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.402
400. Keith R. Szeliga, Conflict and Intrigue in Government Contracts: A Guide
to Identifying and Mitigating Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J.

639, 647 (2006).
401. Id. at 665. See generally Kathleen Clark, Ethics for an Outsourced
Government (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
11-05-0,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1840629.
402. See § 240.10b5-2(b)(1); Cuban, 634 F. Supp. at 728; supra text
accompanying notes 333–334.
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6. ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS FOR MARKET-SENSITIVE DATA

Several sectors of the government already go to great lengths to
ensure that the release of market-sensitive data to the public is handled
in a way that is fair to all investors. Some of these procedures were
adopted in response to scandals involving leaks by executive agency
employees. Recall that, to prevent a reoccurrence of a 1905 scandal,
the USDA adopted strict security measures that protect crop data.403
More recently, in response to SEC and DOJ concerns in 2007 about
possible leakages, the Department of Labor (DOL) and several other
agencies reinforced their procedures to prevent the premature release of
key market-sensitive statistics, such as the monthly Consumer Price
Index (CPI), gas prices, home sales, and the unemployment rate.404
This data is kept inside a lock-up room with the explicit understanding
that that the data will be embargoed until a designated time.405 As the
DOL’s Press Lock-ups Policy Statement explains, “lock-ups provide
press the opportunity to read, review, ask questions about and compose
coverage of the data.”406
A recent dispute between the DOL and several news organizations
over access to the lock-up room is instructive. Upon learning that
certain little-known news organizations were effectively operating as
conduits for hedge funds, the DOL took steps to revoke their press
credentials.407 DOL officials were concerned because securities trades
were being placed from inside the lock-up room immediately upon the
embargo’s expiration and thus before the market as a whole had an
opportunity to access the information.408 Other organizations were
asked to replace their computers in the lock-up room with new
computers that could not be linked automatically to specialized trading
models.409 The DOL took these steps to ensure that its data was released
to “primarily journalistic” news organizations, which would
403. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
404. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Guarding the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2012, at B1 (reporting that the DOL guards the monthly CPI “with launch-code
secrecy, a precaution against anyone who might try to take advantage of an accidental
or a surreptitious leak to gain an insider’s edge in the financial markets, turning
milliseconds into millions”).
405. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR PRESS LOCK-UPS POLICY STATEMENT AND NEWS
ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT (2012), available at www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/
opa/OPA20120672.pdf.
406. Id.
407. Cushman, supra note 404.
408. Id.
409. Id. (observing that, because many hedge funds use computerized trading
programs that are determined in advance, the very act of communicating information to
a hedge fund computer may instantaneously result in a trade).
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immediately share the unembargoed data with the general public or a
broad base of subscribers.410 Other agencies, however, may not be as
willing as the DOL to venture down the politically perilous path of
determining the bona fides of news organization seeking access to
lock-up rooms or briefings.411
Although some executive agencies take extreme precautions in
connection with the release of highly market-sensitive government data,
it is often the case that public disclosure of government information
need not be synchronized in so exact a manner, particularly if
significant cost to taxpayers or impairment of government functions
will result. For example, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
probably does not need to take extraordinary measures to ban cell
phones, Blackberries, and handheld computers from the press room
when it announces a new policy initiative or the award of a significant
government contract. On the other hand, agency staff should not talk
about such developments in the hallways in the days or hours before a
public announcement at a press conference.
Whenever market-moving government information is initially
made public, there will always be some securities traders who are lucky
410. Id. The DOL identified “Need to Know News,” a small enterprise owned
by the German exchange, as an example of an organization whose “data goes directly
from the lock-ups to specialized trading programs.” Id. The DOL explained that Need
to Know News was not “primarily journalistic” and did not “disseminate their
information to a wide audience.” Id.
411. The Treasury Department is another agency that often embargos certain
market-sensitive information announced in press conferences. A 2001 incident reminds
that the misuse of embargoed information may be prosecuted as securities fraud. The
incident involved a political consultant who ultimately pled guilty to charges that he
illegally tipped embargoed T-Bill information to bond traders at Goldman Sachs and
other investment firms. See Davis, Litigation Release No. 18,322, 80 SEC Docket
2952 (Sept. 4, 2003); SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177 (D. Mass. 2009)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the consultant had
illegally misappropriated the T-Bill information and that the tippee-defendant knew or
shown have known that the consultant was breaching a duty of trust and confidence
which he owed to the Treasury Department). Constitutional questions, however, might
arise if a news reporter, as opposed to a consultant, were prosecuted for the premature
publication of embargoed information. Cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528
(2001) (observing that New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(per curiam), “raised, but did not resolve, the question whether, in cases where
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government
may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (holding
that the New York Times could publish portions of a classified Department of Defense
study of United States-Vietnam relations and the conduct of the Vietnam War);
Geoffrey R. Stone, WikiLeaks and the First Amendment, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 477,
487–89 (2012) (discussing the circumstances under which the government can
constitutionally punish the publication or public dissemination of classified
information).
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enough to act on it first, whether due to happenstance or because they
had trading programs already in place.412 The most relevant
consideration for an FGD regime, however, is whether any person’s
trading advantage results from favoritism on the part of an executive
agency, congressional office, or its staff that could have been avoided
without creating an unreasonable cost to taxpayers or undue
interference with the agency or office’s principal functions.
7. CONSULTATIONS WITH AND REFERRALS TO THE SEC
When Congress created the SEC in 1934, it empowered the
agency to regulate the ongoing disclosure practices of SEC reporting
companies.413 Nothing in this charge, however, vests the SEC with the
authority to regulate the ongoing disclosure practices at other executive
agencies or in the legislative or judicial branches of the federal
government. Of course, to the extent that officials in any of the three
branches commit fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security,” Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provide a basis for both civil
and criminal liability.414 And if the elected nature of their offices
provided a reason to doubt that basis for members of Congress (or the
President and Vice President), the STOCK Act expressly removes that
doubt.415
Although the SEC should not embroil itself in matters outside its
regulatory mission, its expertise on disclosure issues is an important
resource that could be tapped by other executive agencies or by officials
in Congress and the courts. Executive, judicial, and congressional
officials should be encouraged to consult with the SEC on issues
relating to fairer government disclosure. Beyond that, if executive,
congressional, or judicial officials have suspicions about the possibility
of fraudulent tipping or trading in securities, a referral to the SEC
should be made immediately.

412. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 n.27 (1983) (“[A]s market values
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information, there
always are winners and losers.”).
413. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 13(a), 73 Stat. 881
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006)).
414. See § 10(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b) (2012).
415. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 4(b), 9(b), 126 Stat. 291 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g) to (h)). Section 4(b) refers expressly to members of
Congress and Section 9(b)(2) specifies that the term “executive branch employee”
includes the President and the Vice President. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Securities trading on the basis of selectively disclosed material
nonpublic information allows investors to profit from access to
knowledgeable sources—whether the source is situated inside a publicly
traded company or inside the federal government. The selective
disclosure to outsiders, however, is unlikely to conflict with the duty of
trust and confidence that is owed to the sources of the information
because the insider usually has an apparently legitimate reason for
communicating the information. Sharing the information, and trading
securities based on that information, thus would not violate the insider
trading prohibitions arising under the federal securities laws. The
selective disclosure and trading nonetheless undermines confidence in
the fairness and integrity of securities markets.
Curtailing the problem of selective disclosure in the private sector
required looking beyond Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The solution
involved regulating the timing and manner of disclosures by corporate
insiders, rather than the conduct of outsiders who gather and trade on
the basis of those disclosures. The SEC embraced this approach in
Regulation FD for publicly traded companies and corporate insiders
have been adhering to it for more than a decade.
In the wake of the tremendous momentum and bipartisan efforts
that led to the passage of the STOCK Act, attention can now turn to
curtailing the problem of selective disclosure by federal officials in the
public sector. A Fairer Government Disclosure (FGD) regime would
boost investor confidence in securities markets and in the integrity of
government itself. But the measures we propose are only a starting
point. There is more study and work to be done—both by government
officials and academics (including ourselves)—as to how an FGD
regime can best be implemented and enforced.

